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INTRODUCTION 
At least since the Supreme Court's 1976 landmark campaign finance 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo,l the link between money and speech has 
been one of the battleground issues in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Buckley's early critics honed in on this question,2 and it continues to 
provoke debate between justices.3 But as the campaign finance cases 
have progressed, and especially with the Court's recent decision in 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,4 which upheld almost all of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, another equally fundamental 
issue has emerged: Is it permissible to restrict campaign contributions or 
independent advocacy not only to prevent corruption, but also, in the 
words of Justice Breyer, lito democratize the influence that money can 
bring to bear upon the electoral process,,?5 While the Buckley Court 
confidently declared that "the concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,,,6 more recent 
decisions, including McConnell, have steadily chipped away at that 
categorical clairn.7 And though a majority of the Court has yet to 
recognize a First Amendment interest in promoting equality of influence 
on or participation in electoral politics, there is a strong argument that 
the outcome of McConnell can be explained only by reference to such a 
principle.s 
1 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.s. 1 (1976). 
2 See J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an 
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. 1. REV. 609, 631-32 (1982); J. Skelly Wright, Politics 
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE 1.J. 1001, 1005 (1976); see also Burt Neubome, 
Buckley's Analytical Flaws, 6 J.1. & POL'Y 111, 115 (1997). 
3 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 378 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) ("Money is property; it is not speech"); id. at 413-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that result of contribution limits "is simply the suppression of political speech"); 
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,649 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Mloney is not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in 
the context of political campaigns." (quoting Buckley, 424 U.s. at 263 (White, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part))); id. at 635-40 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (arguing that "contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon 
freedom of political expression and association as do expenditure limits"). 
4 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.s. 93 (2003). 
5 Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. 1. REV. 245, 
252 (2002). 
6 Buckley, 424 U.s. at 48-49. 
7 See Richard 1. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance 
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. 1. REV. 31, 57-58 
(2004). 
8 Id. at 58-59. There is also a good argument that Buckley's own anticorruption 
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These are familiar observations in discussions of campaign finance 
regulation. What is less often noticed is that the same issues - the 
connection between money and speech and the extent to which there is a 
First Amendment interest in the proper functioning of political forums 
- are central to another, less prominent line of Supreme Court cases. 
These are the cases that establish a First Amendment right against 
compelled subsidization.9 
The basic idea of the compelled subsidization doctrine is that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from requiring some individuals 
to subsidize the First Amendment activities of others. To oversimplify: 
you cannot be forced to pay for someone else's speech. Those who argue 
for such a First Amendment right often quote Thomas Jefferson's 
pronouncement that lito compel a man to furnish contributions of money 
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and 
tyrannical."! To date, the Supreme Court has considered the 
constitutionality of compelled subsidization in four contexts: statutorily 
enabled agency shops (where employees are required to subsidize union 
political activities), integrated bars (where attorneys are required to pay 
for the legislative activities of a state bar association), industry trade 
associations (where industry members are required to help fund generic 
advertising campaigns), and state university student activity fees (where 
students are required to subsidize the political and ideological activities 
of student organizations). It has also been argued that the compelled 
subsidization doctrine should limit the use of Interest on Lawyer Trust 
Account ("IOLTA") funds,l1 mandatory pro bono requirements}2 
rationale tacitly relies on a political equality principle. See David A. Strauss, Corruption, 
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1369-70 (1994); David A. 
Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 143 (1995). 
9 Leslie Gielow Jacobs also explored the possible connection between the First 
Amendment's approaches to campaign finance regulation and to compelled subsidization. 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Link Between Student Activity Fees and Campaign Finance 
Regulations, 33lNo. L. REV. 435 (2000). While the argument irJ this Article is consonant with 
Jacobs's emphasis on the First Amendment's protections agairJst "governmental favoritism 
of certairJ viewpoirJts in the marketplace of ideas," it departs from Jacobs on a number of 
particulars, not the least beirJg whether such favoritism is "[tJhe primary danger against 
which the free speech clause protects." ld. 
10 Thomas Jefferson, The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA 
STATUTE FOR REUGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY, at xvii (Merrill Peterson & Robert Vaughan eds., 1988); see infra notes 99,114. 
11 See Terence E. Doherty, The Constitutionality of IOLTA Accounts, 19 WHITITER L. REV. 
487 (1998); David J. HrirJa, Comment, The Future ofIOLTA: Has the Death Knell Been Sounded 
for Mandatory IOLTA Programs?, 32 AKRON L. REV. 301 (1999); Risa I. Sackmary, Note, 
IOLTA'S Last Obstacle: WashirIgton Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found.'s Faulty 
Analysis of Attorneys' First Amendment Rights, 2 J.L. & POL'y 187 (1994). 
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continuing legal education requirements,!3 the charitable donations of 
utility companies,14 cigarette surtaxes used to fund anti-smoking 
campaigns/5 and some forms of public campaign financing. 16 
Since announcing the right against compelled subsidization in 1977/7 a 
majority of the Supreme Court has remained willing to affirm it. Over 
the years, however, the Court has employed different standards to 
decide compelled subsidization cases. And it has never settled on a 
single account of the doctrine's theoretical underpinnings - just what 
First Amendment interest is threatened by compelled subsidization. In 
recent years, tensions have come to a head. In three separate decisions, 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot (1997)/8 Board of Regents v. Southworth 
(2000)/9 and United States v. United Foods (2001),20 the Supreme Court has 
made significant and, at times, inconsistent amendments to the doctrine, 
without indicating how the new standards are to be reconciled with the 
old or applied to novel cases. At present, it is difficult to discern what 
rules govern compelled subsidization and where the constitutional limits 
lie. 
The root cause of the current confusion is the Supreme Court's failure 
to provide a coherent account of the First Amendment harm of 
compelled subsidization. Part I of this Article describes the present state 
of the doctrine. It identifies a number of practical problems, especially 
the imprecisions in and conflicts between the Court's holdings that leave 
it unclear how lower courts should decide novel cases. Part II is a critical 
discussion of the two most common arguments for a First Amendment 
right against compelled subsidization: that compelled subsidization 
infringes on dissenters' freedom of belief and that it restricts their 
freedom of expression. A comparison of compelled subsidization with 
the First Amendment interests at stake in compelled speech shows that 
neither argument withstands scrutiny and that this deficiency in theory 
" See John C. Scully,. Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on the Constitution, 19 HOFSTRA L. 
REv. 1229 (1991). 
13 See Kari M. Dahlin, Note, Actions Speak Louder than Thoughts: The Constitutionally 
Questionable Reach of the Minnesota CLE Elimination of Bias Requirement, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1725 (2000). 
14 See R. Paul Gee, Note, Who Pays for Charitable Contributions Made by Utility 
Companies?, 12 ENERGY L.J. 363 (1991). 
15 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2004). 
16 See May v. McNally, 55 P.3d 768 (Ariz. 2002). 
17 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
18 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
19 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217 (2000). 
20 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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is the cause of much of the confusion in practice. Part III argues that if 
there is a First Amendment right against compelled subsidization, it is 
grounded not in the liberty interests of dissenting individuals, but in 
compelled subsidization's potential harm to public political discourse. 
This brings a fresh perspective on the idea that there is a First 
Amendment interest in "democratizing the influence of money on the 
electoral process," and suggests a new, more general test for compelled 
subsidization cases. Part IV briefly discusses what it would take to 
transpose the results from a reformed compelled subsidization doctrine 
into the register of campaign finance regulation. 
A decision like McConnell comes along once in a generation. At least 
for the next few years, lower courts probably will be left to their own 
devices in grappling with its implications for campaign finance 
regulation, including the extent to which there is a First Amendment 
interest in regulating equality of influence or participation in the 
electoral sphere. The compelled subsidization doctrine provides an 
opportunity to address these issues without losing oneself in the 
doctrinal and political complexities of campaign finance. The Supreme 
Court will revisit the doctrine this Term in Veneman v. Livestock Marketing 
Ass'ns, a case involving the requirement that beef producers pay for 
generic beef advertising.21 One can only hope that the Court granted 
certiorari in Veneman to deal at least with the confusion in the industry-
association advertising cases. With luck, it will also take the opportunity 
to clarify the doctrine as a whole.22 By clearing away the underbrush 
surrounding compelled subsidization, it may be possible to develop 
tools to attack the jungle of campaign finance. 
I. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE: DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DOCTRINE AS IT Now 
STANDS 
The compelled subsidization doctrine is situated at the periphery of 
First Amendment jurisprudence and has received little sustained 
21 Veneman v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 
S. Ct. 2389 (U.s. May 24,2004) (No. 03-1164). 
22 The Solicitor General's petition for certiorari in the case focuses on another question, 
left undecided in United Foods: whether such industry advertising programs are 
government speech. Pet. for Cert. at 12-24, Veneman v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d 711 
(8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2389 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-1164). If the Court 
were to decide the case on this issue, finding that the program at issue is government 
speech, it would not have to address the compelled subsidization question. This Article 
argues below, however, that basically the same test should apply under either 
characterization. 
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attention, either from courts or from commentators.23 As a result, its 
branches have spread faster than its roots. This part describes the tree 
from the trunk up - the contexts in which the Supreme Court has 
applied the compelled subsidization doctrine and the tests it has 
developed to decide cases. It turns out that the motley collection of 
Supreme Court holdings makes it all but impossible to say how courts 
should decide novel cases. Parts II and III then turn to the roots. Part II 
examines the principal arguments the Court and individual justices have 
used to justify the doctrine. Part III proposes an alternative account of its 
fundament and recommends pruning a few branches. 
The Supreme Court first considered the idea of a First Amendment 
right against compelled subsidization in Railway Employee's Department v. 
Hanson, a 1956 case involving dissenting railway employees' objections 
to mandatory union dues under a federally enabled union sho~ 
agreement.24 The Court avoided the constitutional issue in Hanson. 
And it avoided the issue again in two 1961 decisions, International Ass'n 
of Machinists v. Street,26 which also concerned union shop agreements, 
and Lathrop v. Donahue,27 which dealt with integrated state bars. 
It was not until 1977, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, that a 
majority of the Court was willing to affirm a First Amendment right 
23 The first law review article devoted to the general grounds of the compelled 
subsidization doctrine was Norman L. Cantor's Forced Payments to Seroice Institutions and 
Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-association, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 3 (1983). The 
doctrine has since been given sustained attention by Leslie Gielow Jacobs in Pledges, 
Parades, and Mandatory Payments, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 123 (1999) and Jacobs, supra note 9, 
and by Howard Wasserman in Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TuL. L. 
REV. 163 (2002). Other commentators simply treat the compelled subsidization cases as a 
species of compelled speech cases. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance 
Problem,64 FORDHAM L. REv. 451, 467 (1995); Robert D. Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced 
Expression, 34 LAND & WATER L. Rw. 101, 108-10 (1999). One of the conclusions of this 
Article is that if the compelled subsidization doctrine has a secure foundation, it is different 
from that of the compelled speech doctrine. 
24 Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.s. 225 (1956). 
2S See id. 
" Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740 (1961). 
27 Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 u.s. 820 (1961). While these cases avoided deciding the 
constitutional issue, their statutory construction and strong dissenting and concurring 
opinions from Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Harlan laid the groundwork for the 
constitutional decisions that followed. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 516 
(1991) ("Although [it is a case] of statutory construction, Street [is] instructive in delineating 
the bounds of the First Amendment in this area as well."); id. at 555 (Scalia, J., concurring 
with judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Street [was a statutory case], but there is 
good reason to treat [it] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule suggested in Hanson and 
later confirmed in Abood. Street adopted a construction of the [Railway Labor Act] nowhere 
suggested in its language, to avoid 'serious doubt of [its] constitutionality.'" (quoting 
Street». 
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against compelled subsidization.28 In a series of decisions between 1977 
and 1991, the Court developed the doctrine with respect to two types of 
cases. The first group of cases involved government-enabled union shop 
agreements, in which dissenting employees objected to requirements 
that they help pay for union speech with which they disagreed.29 The 
second dealt with integrated bars, in which attorneys complained of 
being required to pay dues that supported the state bar association's 
expressive activities.3D During this period, the Court's opinions focused 
on the uses to which challenged payments were put. Abood, the case that 
established a First Amendment right against compelled subsidization, 
identified the following salient factors: 
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for 
the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or 
toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to 
its duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the 
constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from 
charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not Object 
to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing SO.3 
This statement emphasizes two questions: Are expenditures germane to 
the activity for which payments are compelled? And, are they political 
or ideological in nature? Abood held that if an expenditure is both 
nongermane and funds political or ideological activities, then it violates 
dissenters' First Amendment rights.32 As the cases progressed, this 
approach was refined and generalized until in 1991, in Lehnert v. Ferris 
28 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.s. 209,235-36 (1977). 
29 Lehnert, 500 U.s. 507; Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood, 431 U.s. 
209. 
30 Kelier v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). In addition to these cases and' 
subsequent cases discussed below, the Supreme Court has ruled on the procedural 
safeguards necessary to protect the rights of dissenting union members and provided 
statutory interpretations that paraliel the First Amendment compelled subsidization 
doctrine. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.s. 866 (1998); Communication Workers of 
Am. v. Beck, 487 U.s. 735 (1988); Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.s. 292 (1986); Minn. 
State Bd. of Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.s. 271 (1984); Bhd. of Ry. & 5.5. Clerks v. Allen, 373 
U.s. 113 (1963); Street, 367 U.s. 740; Hanson, 351 U.S. 225. 
31 Abood, 431 U.s. at 235-36 (italics added); see also id. at 236 (finding relevant 
distinction to be that "between collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may 
be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such 
compulsion is prohibited."). Keller employed an identical test. Keller, 496 U.s. at 14 ("The 
State Bar may ... constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the 
mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an 
ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity."). 
32 Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36. 
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Faculty Ass'n, a majority of the Court agreed with the following 
formulation: 
chargeable activities must (1) be "germane" to collective-bargaining 
activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in 
labor peace and avoiding "free riders"; and (3) not significantly add 
to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of 
. h 31 an agency or uruon sop. 
To further generalize: challenged expenditures violate the First 
Amendment rights of dissenters unless they are (1) germane to (2) a vital 
governmental interest and (3) do not Significantly add to the burden on 
dissenters' free speech interests inherent in the furtherance of that 
interest.34 
In recent years, the Court has moved on to other types of compelled 
subsidization - mandatory assessments for generiC industry advertising 
and state university student-activity fees. In doing so, the Court has 
departed from the Abood-Lehnert approach, as discussed below. 
Nonetheless, Lehnert represents a sort of high-water mark in the 
development of the compelled subsidization doctrine, for it provides the 
most generic statement of when compelled subsidization violates the 
First Amendment, a test that seemingly still applies in the union and 
state bar cases.35 But there are two significant problems with the Lehnert 
test. 
The first is that germaneness is a particularly vague standard. Lehnert 
does not specify how germane an expenditure must be - how closely it 
must relate to the government's legitimate purpose - to survive 
constitutional scrutiny. As the Court has since noted, this problem was 
3J Lehnert, 500 U.s. at 519. 
34 On the way to Lehnert, the Court formulated a somewhat more permissive test. Ellis 
v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks held that the first question to ask is whether the expenditure 
is germane to the union's collective bargaining activities (Le., to the legitimate government 
interest in compelling dissenters to pay). Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456. If expenditures are not 
germane, then they are not allowed. If germane, a court must then ask "whether these 
expenses involve additional interference with the First Amendment interests of objecting 
employees, and, if so, whether they are nonetheless adequately supported by a 
governmental interest." ld. at 456. That is, germane expenditures are constitutional only if 
the governmental interest in compelling payments outweighs the harm to dissenters' First 
Amendment rights. Lehnert replaced this balancing of the government's interest against the 
First Amendment harm with two separate requirements: a vital governmental interest and 
no significant addition to the burden on dissenters' free speech. 
35 See, e.g., Otto v. Penn. State Educ. Ass'n-NEA, 330 F.3d 125, 135-40 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(union dues); Romero v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, 204 F.3d 291, 296-303 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (state bar). 
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manifest in the conflicting opinions in Lehnert itself.36 Justice Marshall, in 
a partial dissent, argued that any expenditure "reasonably designed to 
influence the public employer's position at the bargaining table" was 
germane to a teachers' union's collective bargaining activities.37 He 
concluded that lobbying, public relations campaigns in support of the 
teaching profession in general, and litigation outside of the collective 
bargaining group were all germane to the state's legitimate purpose in 
promoting the agency-shop agreements.38 Justice Scalia, also dissenting 
in part, considered a union expenditure germane only if "incurred for 
the conduct of activities in which the union owes a duty of fair 
representation to nonmembers being charged.,,39 He therefore found 
almost all of the challenged union expenditures - including nonpolitical 
union publications, union conventions, national collective bargaining 
expenses and the costs of preparing for a strike - nongermane and 
nonfundable by the contributions of dissenting employees.40 The Lehnert 
majority wanted a concept of germaneness lying somewhere between 
these extremes, for it disallowed expenditures that Marshall would have 
permitted and allowed expenditures Scalia considered unconstitutiona1.41 
But it failed to specify just where on the spectrum between Marshall and 
Scalia its concept of germaneness lay and thus provided little guidance 
as to how the criterion should be applied. 
A second difficulty comes with the third step of the Lehnert test, which 
requires that expenditures "not significantly add to the burdening of free 
speech that is inherent in the allowance" of the compelled payments.42 In 
order to determine whether a given government action burdens First 
36 Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217, 231-32 (2000) ("Even in the context of a 
labor union, whose functions are, or so we might have thought, well known and 
understood by the law and the courts after a long history of government regulation and 
judicial involvement, we have encountered difficulties in deciding what is germane and 
what is not. The difficulty manifested itself in our decision in Lehnert . .. where different 
members of the Court reached varying conclusions regarding what expressive activity was 
or was not germane to the mission of the association."). 
The various opinions in Lehnert were foreshadowed in the different understandings 
of germaneness in Street. Where the plurality found that political activities were not 
germane to the union's collective bargaining activities, Frankfurter emphasized "the 
practical necessity for unions to participate in ... political activities." Int'l Ass'n of 
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 768, 811 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
37 Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 533 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
38 Id. at 535-37. 
39 [d. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
40 [d. at 550-58. 
41 See id. at 524-27 (criticizing Scalia's proposed germaneness test). 
42 [d. at 519. This third prong presumably explains why Abood emphasized the 
political or ideological nature of certain expenditures. [d. 
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Amendment interests, we must know what the relevant interests are. 
The problem, which Part II explores at length, is that the Court has never 
settled on a good account of just how compelled subsidization threatens 
the First Amendment rights of dissenting payers. Instead, it has 
vacillated between two approaches. The first holds that compelled 
subsidization infringes on dissenters' freedom of belief by requiring 
them to act contrary to their conscience. The second maintains that 
compelled subsidization is simply another form of compelled speech, 
and therefore violates dissenters' First Amendment right to remain 
silent. 
That these different accounts of the relevant First Amendment interest 
can produce conflicting results as to how much payments "add to the 
burdening of free speech" was vividly demonstrated by the first post-
Lehnert decision, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.43 Though 
Wileman did not apply the Lehnert standard in any straightforward way, 
its outcome turned on the question of whether there was a burdening of 
First Amendment interests. The case concerned federally mandated 
assessments on fruit growers that went toward funding generic fruit 
advertising. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that 
compelled subsidization implicates the First Amendment only to the 
extent that it interferes with dissenters' freedom of belief. 
Abood, and the cases that follow it, did not announce a broad First 
Amendment right not to be compelled to provide financial support 
for any organization that conducts expressive activities. Rather, 
Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not being 
compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive 
activities conflict with one's "freedom of belief.,,44 
The majority concluded that the First Amendment right against 
compelled subsidization extends only to cases in which the subsidized 
message creates for the dissenting payer a "crisis of conscience.,,45 While 
"political or ideological disagreement with the content of the message" 
can produce such a crisis, the dissenting fruit growers' objections to the 
advertisements they were required to help fund did not rise to that level 
43 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.s. 457 (1997). 
« [d. at 471 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 235); see also id. at 472 ("[C]ompelled 
contributions for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining implicated First 
Amendment interests because they interfere with the values lying at the 'heart of the First 
Amendment ... the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that 
in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than 
coerced by the State.'" (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35». 
" [d. at 472. 
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and thus did not implicate the First Amendment.46 
Justice Souter's dissent, on the other hand, viewed compelled 
subsidization as a species of compelled speech, which gave rise to the 
following three-step argument. First, commercial speech is due some 
degree of First Amendment protection.47 Second, the Court's compelled-
speech cases have established that "compelling cognizable speech 
officially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is typically subject to 
the same level of scrutiny.,,48 Thus compelled commercial speech is 
subject to the same level of scrutiny as restricted commercial speech. 
Third, compelled subsidization is a species of compelled speech.4 It is 
then a short step to the conclusion that "[s]ince a commercial speaker 
(who does not mislead) may generally promote commerce as he sees fit, 
the government requires some justification ... before it may force him to 
subsidize commercial speech to which he objects."so 
The different accounts of the First Amendment interests at stake in 
Wileman lead the majority and dissent to radically different conclusions 
as to how the case should have come out. The problem is that we have 
not been told just what First Amendment interests the right against 
compelled subsidization is meant to protect. And, without knowing 
that, it is impossible to say when compelled subsidization "significantly 
add[s] to the burdening of free speech that is inherent" in the legitimate 
• 51 program at Issue. 
In recent years, dissatisfaction with the germaneness standard, along 
with the Court's inability to settle on a single account of the relevant First 
Amendment interest, has led to a breakdown of the three-part Lehnert 
test. A third significant problem with the current state of the doctrine is 
that the cases decided since Lehnert have left uncertain what test courts 
should apply to novel cases. 
46 Id. For support of the proposition that the right not to subsidize extends only to 
political or ideological speech, the majority appealed to Lehnert's finding that union 
expenditures for nonpolitical publications do not violate the First Amendment rights of 
dissenting members. Id. at 473 (citing Lehnert, 500 U.s. at 529). 
47 Id. at 478-80 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing inter alia Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.s. 748 (1976)). 
48 Id. at 481. 
49 Id. at 481-82 ("As a familiar corollary to the principle that what may not be 
suppressed may not be coerced, we have recognized ... that individuals have a First 
Amendment interest in freedom from compulsion to subsidize speech and other expressive 
activities undertaken by private and quasi-private organizations."), id. at 487 ("[S]peech 
significant enough to be protected at some level is outside the government's power to 
coerce or to support by mandatory subsidy without further justification."). 
50 [d. at 487. 
51 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.s. 507, 519 (1991). 
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This is most apparent in the competing logics of the two post-Lehnert 
decisions on the compelled subsidization of commercial speech, Wileman 
and United States v. United Foods.52 As already noted, Wileman held in 
1997 that federally mandated assessments to fund fruit advertising did 
not infringe on the First Amendment rights of dissenting fruit growers. 53 
Four years later, however, United Foods concluded that federally 
mandated assessments to fund mushroom advertising violated the First 
Amendment rights of dissenting mushroom producers. 54 Justice 
Kennedy's United Foods· opinion attempts to explain the different 
outcomes by emphasizing the fact that the advertising at issue in 
Wileman was part of a broader program of industry regulation, whereas 
the United Foods assessments on mushroom growers were used almost 
solely to fund advertising.55 But a cursory reading of the opinions in 
these cases reveals deeply conflicting logicS, suggesting that this 
distinction did not make the difference in their outcomes.56 
The different holdings are better explained by the fact that United 
Foods jettisoned Wileman's crisis-of-conscience test. As noted above, the 
Wileman majority categorically rejected the argument that compelled 
subsidization is a form of compelled speech.57 It reasoned instead that 
compelled subsidization implicates the First Amendment only to the 
extent that it interferes with dissenters' freedom of belief, which is to say, 
only when it creates for the dissenting payer a "crisis of conscience."s8 
52 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
53 Wileman, 521 U.S. at 472. 
54 United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 415-16. 
55 Id. at 411-12. 
56 See id. at 419-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting); infra p. 1091. The causal-historical 
explanation of the divergent outcomes lies in the decisions of Kennedy and Stevens to 
switch sides on the issue. Both found the Wileman advertising programs constitutional 
(Stevens writing majority opinion, which Kennedy jOined) and the United Foods advertising 
programs unconstitutional (Kennedy writing majority opinion, which Stevens joined). 
57 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469 (1997) ("[T]he marketing 
orders ... do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech"); id. at 
470-71 ("The use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require respondents to 
repeat an objectionable message out of their own mouths ... require them to use their own 
property to convey an antagonistic ideological message . . . force them to respond to a 
hostile message when they 'would prefer to remain silent,' . . . or require them to be 
publicly identified or associated with another's message .... Respondents are not required 
themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for advertising." (citing 
Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 475 US. 1, 18 (1986), PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980), and W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ.v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 
(1943))). 
58 Id. at 472. Wasserman suggests that the ratio decidendi of Wileman was that the 
Court's "assum[ption] that the complaining producers would agree with [the] general 
idea" of the challenged advertising, which simply encouraged consumers to buy California 
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United Foods did away with Wileman's crisis-of-conscience approach, 
reasoning that "there is no apparent principle which distinguishes out of 
hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better than 
any mushroom" from supposedly more significant disagreements.59 This 
suggests that the Court no longer adheres to the freedom-of-belief 
account of the right not to subsidize. 
United Foods did not, however, return to the freedom-of-speech 
account of Souter's Wileman dissent.6o Without further discussing the 
grounds of the compelled subsidization doctrine, Kennedy's opinion 
instead introduces a new germaneness test: an expenditure must not 
only be germane to a legitimate purpose (the standard used by earlier 
courts61), but it must be germane to a non-expressive program. The 
expenditures at issue in United Foods fail this test because "the expression 
respondent is required to support is not germane to a purpose related to 
an association independent from the speech itself.,,62 The majority 
tree fruit. Wasserman, supra note 23, at 180. I would argue that Wasserman here neglects 
Wileman's focus on the potential for a "crisis of conscience." 
" United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 411; see also id. at 410 ("The subject matter of the speech 
may be of interest to but a small segment of the population; yet those whose business and 
livelihood depend in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem First 
Amendment protection to be just as important for them as it is for other discrete, little 
noticed groups in a society which values the freedom resulting from speech in all its 
diverse parts."). 
United Foods later cites Abood for the proposition that "speech need not be 
characterized as political before it receives First Amendment protection." Id. at 413 (citing 
Abood, 431 U.S. at 232). The opinion refers here to a section of the Abood opinion that 
concerned the plaintiffs' argument that because they were public employees and because 
bargaining in the public sector is inherently political, they suffered a more significant First 
Amendment harm than the plaintiffs in either Hanson or Street. Abood, 431 U.s. at 229-32. 
The Abood Court rejected this argument with the remark that "[n]othing in the First 
Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective 
'political' can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry." Id. at 
232. But the Abood Court's response to this preliminary side issue should not be allowed to 
obscure its emphasis in the main part of the opinion on the political and ideological nature 
of the union's speech. Id. at 234-36. 
60 Stevens, concurring, argued that compelled subsidization should not be considered a 
form of compelled speech, but did not identify his preferred theory of the doctrine or say 
whether he still held onto his Wileman opinion. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 417 (Stevens, 
J., concurring). Thomas, concurring, argued that compelled subsidization is a form of 
compelled speech. Id. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
61 See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.s. at 217-22 (discussing government's interest in promoting 
agency shops, as established by Hanson and Street); id. at 224-25 (relating those interests to 
union's collective-bargaining activities); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (finding 
that expenditures must serve legitimate purpose of integrated bar, which is to improve 
quality of legal profession). 
62 United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 415. Stevens states a similar rule in his concurrence: "a 
compelled subsidy is permissible when it is ancillary, or 'germane,' to a valid cooperative 
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OpInIOn does not provide an argument for this new constitutional 
criterion, but Stevens suggests one in his concurrence: 
The incremental impact on the liberty of a person who has already 
surrendered far greater liberty to the collective entity (either 
voluntarily or as a result of permissible compulsion) does not, in my 
judgment, raise a significant constitutional issue if it is ancillary to 
the main purpose of the collective program. . .. The naked 
imposition of such compulsion, like naked restraint on speech itself, 
seems quite different to me.63 
The apparent idea behind Stevens's argument was succinctly captured 
by Karl Llewellyn: "An institution we could not honor naked, we should 
not dare to strip.,,64 
The tension between the Court's industry advertising cases can be 
summarized as follows. While United Foods did not overrule Wileman, it 
explicitly rejected the logic on which the earlier case had been decided. 
But if we no longer have the crisis-of-conscience test, it is difficult to see 
how the outcome in Wileman can stand. Moreover, instead of providing 
an alternative to Wileman's general crisis-of-conscience test, United Foods 
introduces a new test that applies only in very specific circumstances, 
namely, where compelled payments fund exclusively expressive 
activities, as opposed to a broader regulatory program of which 
expressive activities are merely a part. Finally, United Foods leaves it 
unclear just why the First Amendment includes a right against 
compelled subsidization. While implicitly rejecting Wileman's emphasis 
on freedom of belief, it does not suggest an alternative account of the 
right. Justices Stevens and Thomas su~gest sharply different answers to 
that question in separate concurrences. This is evidence that there is no 
endeavor." Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
63 Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring). In a footnote to the above, Stevens makes the 
striking statement that not only is compulsion as bad as restriction, but "government 
compulsion to finance objectionable speech imposes a greater restraint on liberty than 
government regulation of money used to subsidize the speech of others." Id. at 418 n.··. 
Stevens provides no argument for this proposition, but perhaps felt it necessary to justify 
his apparently contrary opinions about restrictions on campaign contributions. See Nixon 
v. Shrink, 528 U.s. 377, 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring) (doubting whether campaign 
contributions deserve same level of protection against restriction as speech they help fund). 
'" KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 125 (2DED.1951). 
65 United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with Breyer, in 
dissent, that "the program at issue in this case ... 'does not compel speech itself; it compels 
the payment of money'''); id. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring) (affirming his view "that 
paying money for the purpose of advertising involves speech, and ... compelling speech 
raises a First Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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longer a majority opinion among the Court as to why there is a First 
Amendment right not to subsidize. 
These unresolved inconsistencies have left lower courts without any 
clear guidance on how to decide industry-association advertising cases. 
The confusion is exemplified by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Livestock 
Marketing Ass'n v. Department of Agriculture.66 After explaining that it 
was "duty-bound to reconcile and apply the precedents of the Supreme 
Court to the best of [its] ability,,,67 the panel guessed that if given the 
chance, the United Foods majority would have applied the Central Hudson 
test for commercial speech.68 It then read both the germaneness standard 
from the Court's early compelled subsidization cases and Southworth's 
viewpoint-neutrality test (see below) as methods for determining 
"whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve 
that interest.,,69 But then, rather than applying these rules, the Eighth 
Circuit declined to "engage in such a line-drawing exercise,,,70 and 
simply found that the challenged beef marketing program was identical 
in all material respects to the mushroom checkoff program in United 
Foods, and therefore violated the First Amendment. 71 As noted above, 
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. 
For the most part, both Wileman and United Foods ignore the three-part 
Lehnert test. One can read each case, however, as attempting in its own 
way to modify that standard.72 The Court's third recent compelled 
.. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n. v. United States Oep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2004). 
67 ld. at 725. 
68 ld. at 722; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). In considering the possible applicability of the Central Hudson test, the United Foods 
Court did note that the government had not raised that argument as a reason not to apply 
it in that case, but it also emphasized that the Central Hudson approach had "been subject to 
some criticism" by members of the Court. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 409-10. And 
nowhere did the United Foods majority suggest that the Central Hudson test would be 
appropriate or that it was overruling Wileman's conclusion that "lilt was ... error for the 
Court of Appeals to rely on Central Hudson for the purpose of testing the constitutionality 
of market order assessments for promotional advertising." Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & 
Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 474 (1997). Breyer, in dissent, suggested that the special considerations 
applicable to commercial speech should also apply to the dissenting mushroom growers, 
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 426-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but concluded that the program 
at issue would pass the Central Hudson test, id. at 429-31. 
" Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 723 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.s. at 566). 
10 ld. at 725. 
71 ld. at 725-26. 
72 Souter, dissenting from Wileman, criticizes the majority for not considering the 
second two prongs of the Lehnert test. Wileman, 521 U.s. at 485 (Souter, J., dissenting). But 
given the basic premise of the majority's opinion - that non-ideological speech cannot 
offend the First Amendment rights of those forced to pay for it - the question of whether 
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subsidization decision, Board of Regents v. Southworth, involves a more 
radical departure. 73 
Southworth considered whether a state university's mandatory student 
fees, used to fund the political and ideological speech of student 
organizations, violat~d the First Amendment rights of dissenting 
students - a question that had divided the circuits74 and given rise to a 
deluge of student notes.75 The Seventh Circuit applied the three-part 
the speech is ideological or not directly addresses the test's third prong: whether 
challenged assessments significantly add to the burdening of free speech. Thus one might 
read Wileman not as introducing a special test for commercial speech, but as applying the 
general test for compelled speech to argue that the compelled subsidization of strictly 
commercial speech cannot run afoul of the First Amendment. 
Incredibly, Kennedy's United Foods opinion never even mentions Lehnert. However, 
as argued above, the reasoning can be viewed as a modification of the traditional 
germaneness test - the first step in Lehnert's three-pronged test. It seems that after United 
Foods, an expenditure for expressive activities passes the first prong of the Lehnert test only 
if it is germane to the state's legitimate purpose in imposing mandatory payments (the 
original criterion) and to a broader program that includes non-expressive components (the 
United Foods innovation). 
73 Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
74 See id. at 227-28 (citing cases). 
75 See, e.g., Donna M. Cote, Comment, The First Amendment and Compulsory Funding of 
Student Government Political Resolutions at State Universities, 62 U. CHI. 1. REV. 825 (1995); 
Travis Crabtree, Note, Southworth v. Grebe: The Inquisition of the First Amendment, 36 
Hous. 1. REV. 1093 (1999); David E. Frank, Note, First Amendment Protection from M1lndatory 
Subsidization of Political Speech in Public Colleges and Universities: The Marketplace Just Got a 
Lot Less Expensive, 48 DRAKE 1. REV. 359 (2000); Michael J. Hamblin, Note, Southworth v. 
Grebe: Why the Seventh Circuit's Decision Was the Correct Response to Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 46 WAYNE 1. REV. 361 (2000); Marita Erbeck 
Aimee Hamoy, Survey, Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 120 S. 
Ct. 1346 (2000), 11 SETON HALL CONST. 1.J. 211 (2000); Jeff Homer, Commentary, Student 
Fees and First Amendment Concerns, 120 Eoue. 1. REP. 911 (1997); Kim Hudson, Comment, To 
Fee or Not to Fee: The Use of Mandatory Student Activity Fees to Fund Private Organizations that 
Engage in Political or Ideological Speech or Activity, 30 CUMBo 1. REV. 277 (1999-2000); Ryiah 
Lilith, Current Event, Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth No. 
98-1189, 2000 WL 293217, (U.S. March 22, 2000), 8 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & 1. 809 
(2000); Ralph Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Commentary, Mandatory Student Fees and Free 
Speech, 132 Eoue. 1. REP. 265 (1999); Ralph Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Commentary: 
The Supreme Court Upholds Mandatory Student Fees, 145 Eoue. 1. REP. 865 (2000); Meredith R. 
Miller, Comment, Southworth V. Grebe: The Conservative Utilization of "Negative" First 
Amendment Rights to Attack Diversity of Thought at Public Universities, 65 BROOK. 1. REV. 529 
(1999); Monte Arthur Mills, Note, The Student, the First Amendment, and the Mandatory Fee, 
85 IOWA 1. REV. 387 (1999); Michael R. O'Neill, California Supreme Court Survey: August 
1992 - September 1993, Smith V. Regents of the University of California, 21 PEPP. 1. REV. 287 
(1993); Kelly Kathleen Ryan, Note, The Cost of Free Speech: First Amendment Limitations of 
Student Activity Funds - Southworth v. Grebe, 83 MARQ. 1. REV. 707 (2000); Christine 
Theroux, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandatory Student Activity Fee Systems: All 
Students Benefit, 33 CONN. 1. REV. 691 (2001); Kari Thoe, Note, A Learning Experience: 
Discovering the Balance Between Fees-Funded Public Fora and Compelled-Speech Rights at 
American Universities, 82 MINN. 1. REV. 1425 (1998); Scott 1. Walker, Note, I'll Speak for 
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Lehnert test to the question.76 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the 
Lehnert standard - or any other germaneness test - as applied to 
student activity fees. The Court argued, first, that the germaneness 
standard was too vague to be of much use, as evidenced by the divergent 
opinions on the germaneness of union expenditures in Lehnert.77 Second, 
the Court maintained that it was particularly inappropriate for courts to 
determine what is germane to the mission of a university because such 
determinations involve imposing limitations "contrary to the very goal 
the University seeks to pursue.,,78 Instead of the three-part Lehnert test, 
given that the university had a legitimate interest in funding student 
activities, "[t]he proper measure, and the principal standard of 
protection for objecting students . . . is the requirement of viewpoint 
neutrality in the allocation of funding support.,,79 
While Kennedy'S majority opinion in Southworth is dear as to the 
reason for the Court's departure from the Lehnert test, it gives little or no 
guidance as to whether or when courts should apply the viewpoint-
neutrality test in the future. There are three possible readings. The 
narrowest is that the Southworth test applies only to some subset of 
Myself Compulsory Speech and the Use of Student Fees at State Universities, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 
341 (1999); Robert L. Waring, Comment, Talk Is Not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at Public 
Universities on Trial, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 541 (1995); Matthew 1. Weinstein, Note, I'm Paying for 
That? - Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandating Student Activity Fees to Support 
Objectionable Political and Ideological Activities at Public Universities in Southworth v. Grebe, 
44 VILL. L. REv. 257 (1999); Walter James White, Comment, Exploring the Constitutionality of 
Subsidizing Political Speech with Mandatory Student Activity Fees: Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 69 MISS. L.J. 1221 (2000); Carolyn Wiggin, 
Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory Student Fees to Support 
Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009 (1994). In addition to student notes, 
see Robert M. O'Neil, Student Fees and Student Rights: Evolving Constitutional Principles, 25 
J.e. & U.L. 569 (1999); Kevin F. O'Shea, First Amendment Cases in Higher Education, 26 J.e. & 
U.L. 193 (1999); Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, Mandatory Student Fees: Forcing Some to 
Pay for the Free Speech of Others, 20 WHITIIER L. REV. 759 (1999). 
7. Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 724-33 (7th Cir. 1998). 
77 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232. For a description of the varying opinions in Lehnert, see 
infra pp. 1091-09. 
78 Id. at 232. 
79 Id. at 233; see also id. at 230 ("We decide that the viewpoint neutrality requirement of 
the University program is in general sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting 
students."). 
The test is taken from the Court's public-forum cases, particularly Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.s. 819 (1995) (cited at Southworth, 529 U.s. at 
233), which held that a state university's student-activities program created a public forum 
and therefore must be administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion to protect the rights of 
potentially excluded groups. See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229-30 (discussing Lamb's 
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.s. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263 (1981». 
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compelled subsidization cases. The opinion's emphasis on the 
undesirability of judicial decisions as to what is germane in a university 
setting might suggest, for instance, that the viewpoint-neutrality test 
applies only where it is difficult or inappropriate for a court to adjudge 
germaneness. Along these lines, Leslie Gielow Jacobs has suggested that 
the Southworth test should apply only where the purpose of the program 
at issue is "to create a public forum for speech and debate," while the 
Lehnert test still governs cases where "the government create[s] an 
organization to serve a primarily nonspeech function."so 
But if viewpoint neutrality provides enough First Amendment 
protection in some contexts, why it is it not sufficient in others? That is, 
if dissenters' rights were not violated by the viewpoint-neutral 
disbursements challenged in Southworth, the same should be true of 
other species of viewpoint-neutral disbursements - whether or not 
germaneness can be adjudged or even if the program serves "a primarily 
nonspeech function."sl Thus a second, more plausible reading is that 
Southworth provides an independently sufficient criterion for 
constitutional validity: so long as mandatory payments go to a 
legitimate governmental program and are distributed in a viewpoint-
neutral manner, they do not violate dissenters' right against compelled 
subsidization, whether or not they pass the Lehnert test. 
But one cannot ignore the fact that Southworth also criticizes the 
germaneness criterion as being too vague to be of any use. This, 
combined with the fact that neither Wileman nor United Foods expressly 
employed the Lehnert test, suggests a third reading: the Supreme Court 
is in the process of abandoning the Lehnert test or any other germaneness 
standard. But if this is the case, it is difficult to know what will take 
Lehnert's place. So far, the Court has not articulated any new test general 
enough to decide the variety of cases that have come before it, not to 
mention the other contexts where the doctrine might apply.s2 
80 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 443-44. 
81 In fact, when Jacobs attempts to explain why constitutional scrutiny was appropriate 
in the union and integrated bar cases, she recurs to the potential "skewing of the 
marketplace of ideas," a mode of argument that a broader reading of Southworth's 
viewpoint neutrality test captures. Id. at 443; see infra pp. 145-46. 
82 Wasserman faults Southworth's viewpoint-neutrality test as opening the floodgates 
to as-applied challenges to legitimate government sponsored public forms. Wasserman, 
supra note 23, at 217-19, 228-31. His argument consists of two parts. First, because a 
requirement of mere facial neutrality could be easily skirted, the Southworth test must look 
to the actual application of the program, from which it follows that "a single 
viewpoint-discriminatory decision, even one made in disregard for the plain, 
viewpoint-neutral language of the program regulations, is sufficient to render the program 
viewpoint-discriminatory and to trigger the objector's right." Id. at 217. Second, because 
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Even without a single, generally applicable test for when compelled 
subsidization violates the First Amendment, the Court might have 
provided some per se rules for specific categories of expenditures. Over 
the years, two viable candidates for such rules have emerged: 
expenditures for political and ideological activities and expenditures for 
commercial advertising. But - and this is yet another weakness of the 
current doctrine-the Court has failed to settle on a rule for either. 
The decisions leading up to and including Lehnert might be read to 
stand at least for the proposition that the compelled subsidization of 
political and ideological speech is, as such, impermissible. Abood and 
Keller suggested that in the contexts of the union shop and integrated 
bar, political or ideological expenditures were per se unconstitutional. 
Lehnert, the next case to consider such expenditures, allowed certain 
nonpolitical union outlays, but found that each of the challenged 
political expenditures failed its three-part test. And, in fact, the Court 
has never found ~olitical or ideological expenditures germane to a 
legitimate purpose and has said that such uses pose a particularly 
heavy burden on dissenters' freedom of expression.84 
the right against compelled subsidization adheres in every payer, Southworth gives 
standing to anyone required to pay for the public forum, whereas under the public forum 
doctrine only those excluded have standing. Id. at 218-19, 229-30. He concludes: 
The reliance on viewpoint neutrality in evaluating objecting payers' rights 
produces the perverse result of an overall decrease in the amount of speech, [if] 
government makes a single improper Viewpoint-discriminatory denial of access, 
it now must refund some portion of the collected funds to any objecting payer or 
payers ... By contrast, the ordinary remedy where a speaker unconstitutionally 
is denied access to a public forum is to require government to admit that speaker 
to the forum; this broadens access and increases the sum total of expression 
facilitated by the forum and available in the marketplace. 
Id. at 230. But damages for a successful compelled subsidization challenge are relatively 
small - a refund of a portion of the exacted funds in proportion that the prohibited 
expenditures bear to total expenditures. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
237-42 (1977). As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that this amount will be enough 
either to over-incentivize litigation or to undermine legitimate expressive programs. 
83 See Ferris Faculty Ass'n v. Lehnert, 500 U.S. 507, 527, 528-29 (1991); Keller v. State 
Bar of Cal., 496 U.s. I, 14 (1990); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No.1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 
294 (1986); Abood, 431 U.s. at 235; Bhd. of Ry. & S.s. Clerks, v. Allen, 373 U.s. 113, 121 
(1963); inri Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 768 (1961). But see Lehnert, 500 U.S. 
at 535-37 (Marshall, }., dissenting) (arguing that union lobbying activities are germane to 
collective bargaining); Street, 367 U.S. at 811 (Frankfurter, }., dissenting) (arguing "the 
practical necessity for unions to participate in what as a matter of analytical fragmentation 
may be called political activities"). 
84 See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 522 ("Where the subject of compelled speech [sic] is the 
discussion of governmental affairs, which is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms, 
the burden upon dissenters' rights extends far beyond the acceptance of the agency shop 
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Southworth, however, forecloses any per se rule. The student fees at 
issue in that case unquestionably went to pay for the political and 
ideological activities of student organizations,85 yet the Court held that so 
long as the funds were distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner, 
dissenting students' First Amendment rights were adequately protected. 
Now, one might want to distinguish Southworth as applying a different 
test than Lehnert and other cases. But once one allows that the compelled 
subsidization of political and ideological activities can pass the 
Southworth test, there is much less reason to assume that they must fail a 
germaneness, or any other, standard. And certainly after Southworth it 
cannot be argued that such expenditures automatically violate the First 
Amendment. 
The other candidate for a per se rule is mandatory payments for 
commercial speech. Wileman attempted to establish such a rule, 
concluding that the compelled subsidization of commercial advertising 
cannot give rise to a crisis of conscience and, as a result, cannot violate 
the First Amendment.86 In fact, Wileman suggests that only "political or 
ideological disagreement with the content of a message" can meet the 
crisis-of-consciousness test,S7 from which would follow a per se rule 
covering all nonpolitical and non-ideological activities. United Foods, 
however, rejected such a rule even for commercial speech. According to 
United Foods, Wileman's crisis-of-conscience test is unprincipled and 
and is constitutionally impermissible." (citations omitted». 
85 The student organizations to which dissenting students objected included the 
International Socialist Organization, the College Democrats, the College Republicans, a 
student environmental group, a community legal office and the Wisconsin Student Public 
Interest Research Group. Southworth, 529 U.s. at 223. The plaintiffs alleged, and the 
university admitted, that those organizations engaged in "political and ideological 
expression." ld. at 224, 227. 
86 Prior to Wileman, the Court's rulings concerning nonpolitical, non-ideological 
expenditures suggested that there was no per se rule for that category. Ellis, the first case to 
consider nonpolitical expenditures, held that some union expenditures for nonpolitical, 
non-ideological activities (organizing efforts and litigation not related to the bargaining 
unit in question) were not germane to collective bargaining, but that others (conventions 
and union publications) were both germane and sufficiently supported by the 
government's interest to pass First Amendment scrutiny. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 
U.s. 448, 448-51 (1976). Lehnert, applying a somewhat more stringent test, found 
constitutional all of the nonpolitical, non-ideological expenditures that dissenting 
employees challenged (litigation supporting the collective bargaining efforts of other 
bargaining units, internal nonpolitical publications, support of parent organizations, and 
expenses incident to strike preparation). Lehnert, 500 U.s. at 527-32. Together, these 
opinions suggest that expenditures for nonpolitical, non-ideological speech must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, applying the general standards governing compelled 
subsidization. 
87 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457,472 (1997). 
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dissenting payers' mere disagreement with the subsidized speech is 
enough to trigger First Amendment scrutiny.88 At the very least, this 
means that the commercial character of subsidized expression cannot 
exempt a program from scrutiny. And this reasoning might even be 
extended to argue against any per se rule for political and ideological 
expenditures. If there is no principled distinction between the First 
Amendment harm created by political or ideological expenditures and 
that created by nonpolitical, non-ideological speech,89 and if the 
compelled subsidization of some non-ideological speech is permissible 
(see Ellis, Lehnert, and Wileman), then so might the compelled 
subsidization of some political and ideological speech. Given the sharp 
divergence between Wileman and United Foods, the status of the 
compelled subsidization of commercial expression remains unclear, as 
does the status of expenditures for nonpolitical, non-ideological speech 
in general. 
A final difficulty with the current state of the doctrine is the 
unprincipled character of the United Foods decision. In order to avoid 
overruling Wileman, Kennedy's majority opinion distinguishes it based 
on the idea that there is a greater First Amendment harm where 
compelled payments fund a purely expressive program than where they 
fund a program that has non-expressive components.90 This claim also 
stands behind the ruling in the case - because the Mushroom Council 
engaged primarily in expressive activities, the program violated 
dissenting industry members' First Amendment right against compelled 
subsidization. But, as Breyer pointed out in dissent, this approach is 
problematic both in principle and in its practical consequences. As a 
matter of principle, it is perverse to hold that the more heavily regulated 
an industry is, the less First Amendment protection its members have.91 
88 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,411 (2001). 
89 Id. at 410-11 ("The subject matter of the speech may be of interest to but a small 
segment of the population; yet those whose business and livelihood depend in some way 
upon the product involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as 
important for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups in a society which values 
the freedom resulting from speech in all its diverse parts ... First Amendment values are at 
serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of 
citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors; and there is no 
apparent principle which distinguishes out of hand minor debates about whether a 
branded mushroom is better than just any mushroom."). 
90 Id.at411-12. 
91 Id. at 422 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Compared with traditional 'command and 
control,' price, or output regulation, [the challenged] regulation - which relies upon self-
regulation through industry trade associations and upon the dissemination of information 
- is more consistent, not less consistent, with producer choice. It is difficult to see why a 
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As a practical matter, the distinction gives regulators who want to use 
compelled fees to pay for commercial advertisement an incentive to 
increase the level of regulation, to add non-expressive components (price 
or output controls, grading, certification, and so forth) in order to avoid 
the holding of United Foods.92 More fundamentally, the majority in 
United Foods gives no reason why this distinction should make a 
difference in the outcome of compelled subsidization cases. The 
distinction is not connected to the machinery of First Amendment 
analysis and, as such, is untenable.93 
The current confusion in the doctrine can be summarized as follows. 
In 1991, Lehnert provided a seemingly clear test - challenged 
expenditures must be germane to a vital governmental interest and not 
significantly add to the burden on dissenters' free speech interests 
inherent in the program. In practice, however, the Lehnert standard is 
difficult to apply, because the Court has specified neither how 
"germane" an expenditure must be nor what free speech interests 
payments burden. Nine years later, Southworth introduced a 
fundamentally different standard - compelled payments for the 
expressive activities of others do not violate dissenters' First Amendment 
rights so long as the state has a legitimate purpose in imposing the 
payments and funds are distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner. But 
Southworth leaves it unclear whether its viewpoint-neutrality test is 
meant to apply only to some cases, to serve as an independent test for 
constitutionality, or to be the first step towards replacing the unworkable 
Lehnert standard. Nor do Wileman and United Foods provide any 
indication of the continuing relevance of the Lehnert test or its 
predecessors. Instead, both introduce additional considerations -
whether the qisputed activities might cause a crisis of conscience and 
whether compelled payments also fund non-expressive activities -
without clarifying how they fit in with any general standard or should 
Constitution that seeks to protect individual freedom would consider the absence of 'heavy 
regulation' to amount to a special determinative reason for refusing to permit this less 
intrusive program." (citation omitted)). 
92 ld. at 429 (arguing that Court's decision "creates an incentive to increase the 
Government's involvement in any information-based regulatory program."). 
93 With respect to commercial speech, the Supreme Court has held that "the State's 
power to regulate commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate 
commercial speech that is 'linked inextricably' to those transactions." 44 Liquormart, Inc. 
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.s. 484, 499 (1996) (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)). 
But United Foods does not suggest that there must be an inextricable link between the 
generic industry advertising and the requisite non-expressive components of the program. 
And there does not seem to have been such a link in the program at issue in Wileman. 
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be reconciled with each other.94 Nor has the Court adhered to any per se 
rules about certain categories of expenditures. Political or ideological 
speech at one time looked as if it might always violate the First 
Amendment rights of dissenting payers, but cannot be the basis for a per 
se rule after Southworth. And while Wileman suggested that commercial 
speech could never give rise to a First Amendment problem, the Court in 
United Foods rejected such a rule only four years later. Lastly, it is 
difficult to know what to make of the United Foods emphasis on whether 
compelled subsidization is part of a broader regulatory program with 
non-expressive elements. 
II. PROBLEMS IN 'THEORY: 'THE COURT'S FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE 
DOCTRINE 
Many of the practical problems with the doctrine can be traced back to 
the Supreme Court's failure to settle on a coherent account of why the 
compelled subsidization of the speech of others implicates the First 
Amendment. This part examines two separate arguments that justices 
have used to explain the First Amendment right not to subsidize, one 
based on dissenters' freedom of belief and the other on freedom of 
expression. Both posit harms to the First Amendment rights of 
individual payers. Neither is satisfactory.95 Part III proposes an 
alternative account of the right not to subsidize, according to which 
compelled subsidization raises First Amendment issues not because of a 
harm to individual dissenters, but because of the risk of improper 
governmental interference in public political discourse. 
It is useful to approach the two claimed harms to individual dissenters 
by way of the now well-established and better-understood First 
Amendment right against compelled speech - one's right not to be 
forced to express a message oneself, as opposed to paying for the 
message of another. The Supreme Court's early compelled speech 
decisions reflected the idea that compelled speech violates dissenters' 
freedom of belief. Later decisions have focused on the effects of 
" Lawrence Tribe has made a similar point about Wileman and Southworth, which, he 
argues, have been left "to drift awhile beyond the broad current otherwise running through 
the cases, until later decisions hopefully steer both precedents into the mainstream." 
Lawrence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. 
REV. 641, 647 (2001). Presumably Tribe would consider the result in United Foods to be a 
step back in the correct direction, as he successfully represented the plaintiffs before the 
Supreme Court in that case. Id. at 646 n.36. 
95 For a similar thesis, supported by somewhat different arguments, see Cantor, supra 
note 23, at 14-29. It is unfortunate that Cantor's thoughtful early analysis of the issues 
involved in compelled subsidization has largely been lost on the courts. 
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compelled speech on dissenters' expressive capacities. A number of 
commentators have suggested that compelled subsidization is merely a 
species of compelled speech.96 The argument in this part is that the 
compelled subsidization of the speech 'of others causes individual 
dissenters none of the First Amendment harms caused by compelled 
speech. Nor has the Court provided an alternative account of the First 
Amendment harm, leaving the compelled subsidization doctrine 
essentially adrift. 
A. Does Compelled Subsidization Violate Dissenters' Freedom of Belief? 
When describing the First Amendment right against compelled 
subsidization, the Court and individual justices have repeatedly invoked 
Thomas Jefferson's statements that "to compel a man to furnish 
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.,,97 Justice Stevens's Wileman opinion 
explained the freedom-of-belief argument as follows: 
[C]ompelled contributions for political purposes unrelated to 
collective bargaining implicated First Amendment interests because 
they interfere with the values lying at the "heart of the First 
Amendment ... the notion that an individual should be free to 
believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be 
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the 
State.,,98 
96 See Greene, supra note 23; Kamenshine, supra note 23. Jacobs also assimilates the 
compelled speech and compelled subsidization doctrines, though Jacobs doesn't explain 
the one in terms of the other, but attempts to reform both together. Jacobs, supra note 23; 
see also Wasserman, supra note 23, at 169-90 (treating compelled subsidization and 
compelled speech as subcategories of "compelled expression"); id. at 205-06 ("The right at 
issue [in compelled subsidization] is to refrain from speaking and the sole point is that an 
individual should not be forced to support private speech."). 
97 Jefferson, supra note 10, at xvii, quoted in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 10 
(1990); Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 n.15 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd. 
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,235 n.31 (1977); int'I Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 779 
n.4 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 790 (Black, J., dissenting). 
Another common quotation is Madison's observation that "the same authority 
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of 
anyone establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases 
whatsoever." II James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901), quoted in Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306 
n.15; Abood, 431 U.s. at 235 n.31; Street, 367 U.s. at 779 n.4 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 
790 (Black, J., dissenting). 
98 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997) (quoting Abood, 431 U.s. 
at 234-35); see also id. at 471 ("Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not 
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Compelled subsidization supposedly interferes with freedom of belief 
because it forces dissenting payers to act in a way contrary to their 
consciences. But on closer examination, it is impossible to see how 
compelled payments - even when used for speech - present a 
distinctively First Amendment harm to dissenters' freedom of belief. To 
see why this is so, it is helpful to begin with the threat that compelled 
speech poses to freedom of belief. 
It is possible to frame matters so that it is not obvious why requiring 
someone even to voice certain words - much less requiring her to pay 
for someone else to voice those words - interferes with her freedom of 
belief. We all know that what a person says need not correspond to 
what she believes, especially when she is forced to say it. Think of the 
Hollywood prisoner of war, forced to state his allegiance to the enemy, 
but in his heart remaining true to his own country. Or Huck Finn, 
dutifully reciting his prayers at the Widow Douglas's house, while 
secretly questioning the coherence of her faith. 
Moreover, compelled speech is hardly the only way that the 
government requires people to act contrary to their beliefs. Catholic 
charities may be required to pay for insurance that covers 
contraceptives.99 Tax laws demand that everyone earning more than a 
specified amount pay income tax, regardless of whether they agree with 
the government programs funded by their tax dollars. loo More broadly, 
being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with 
one's 'freedom of belief."'); Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36 ("The fact that the appellants are 
compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political 
purposes works no less an infringement on their constitutional rights. For at the heart of 
the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, 
and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience 
rather than coerced by the state."); Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting) ("At stake here is the interest of the individual lawyers of Wisconsin in having 
full freedom to think their own thoughts, speak their own minds, support their own causes 
and wholeheartedly fight whatever they are against."); Street, 367 U.s. at 776 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that compelled subsidization requires dissenters "to surrender ... 
matters of conscience, belief or expression"); id. at 788 (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding 
that compelled subsidization violates individual dissenters' rights to "think, speak, write 
and worship as they wish"). 
99 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 95 (Cal. 
2004); Inimai M. Chettiar, Comment, Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Eliminating Gender 
Discrimination or Infringing on Religious Liberties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1867 (2002). 
100 Powell, concurring in Abood, suggested that "[c]ompelled support of a private 
association is fundamentally different from compelled support of government" because 
"government is representative of the people" and "[t]he same cannot be said of a union, 
which is representative only of one segment of the population, with certain common 
interests." Abood, 431 U.s. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring). As Tribe pOints out, this 
argument is unsatisfactory. "[S]ince the authority of the public employees' union to 
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virtually every coercive law - from child welfare laws to workforce 
safety regulations to speed limits - is open to the objection that it will 
force some people to act against what they believe best. If compelled 
speech involves a special First Amendment harm to freedom of belief, it 
must be distinguished from these other forms of government coercion. 
We need a fuller account of just how compelled speech, and then also of 
how the compelled subsidization of the speech of others, threatens 
freedom of belief. 
The early compelled speech cases suggest two possible answers to the 
first question: compelled speech threatens freedom of belief, first, when 
it is used as a tool of indoctrination and, second, when it interferes with 
the free exercise of belief. The first Supreme Court decision to recognize 
a First Amendment right against compelled speech, West Virginia v. 
Barnette, emphasized indoctrination.!01 West Virginia had required 
school children to salute the flag, else face expulsion.102 The plaintiffs 
were Jehovah's Witnesses and considered saluting the flag contrary to 
their religious duties.!03 The majority posed the question as whether 
state indoctrination was consistent with the Constitution.104 With 
National Socialism looming in the background, the Court held: 
Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public 
opinion by authority. . . If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of oginion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein. 5 
When the state compels speech in the service of indoctrination, it 
threatens the citizenry's freedom of belief and infringes on its First 
Amendment rights. 
The other way compelled speech can interfere with freedom of belief is 
when it prevents a person from exercising or acting on her beliefs in 
compel support is derived from the legislature, the cases seem hard to distinguish on any 
private-public ground." LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 808 n.14 
(2d ed. 1988). Nor can Powell's distinction explain the outcome in Southworth, in which 
funds again went to private groups. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217 (2000). 
Finally, Powell's argument does not isolate what is special about the compelled 
subsidization of private speech - why it is different from, say, the harm to the committed 
Catholic of being required to pay into a health insurance plan that pays for birth control. 
101 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
102 Id. at 626-29. 
103 Id. at 629. 
104 Id. at 640-42. 
105 [d. 
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some important way. This aspect was also present in Barnette, where the 
plaintiffs argued that saluting the flag interfered with their commitment 
to Exodus 20:4-5 ("Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image ... 
nor bow down thyself to them nor serve them.,,).I06 Interference with 
freedom of belief was also central to the decision in Wooley v. Maynard/o7 
the Court's next significant compelled speech case. Wooley considered a 
Jehovah's Witness's objection to New Hampshire's requirement that his 
license plate display the motto "Live Free or Die," which he found 
"morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent.,,108 New 
Hampshire's license plate was clearly not an attempt to indoctrinate (a 
driver rarely sees her own license plate). Nonetheless, the Court found 
the requirement unconstitutional: "The First Amendment protects the 
right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority 
and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea 
they find morally objectionable."I09 The interference with freedom of 
belief here was not in the form of indoctrination, but in preventing the 
plaintiff from acting in accordance with his most deeply held 
convictions, which in this case required that he not display the state 
motto. 
So, these are two ways the Court has identified in which compelled 
speech can interfere with the freedom of belief. The next question is 
whether compelled subsidization of speech interferes with belief in either 
of these ways. (If there is another sort of interference with dissenters' 
freedom of belief, proponents of the doctrines have yet to identify it.) 
Indoctrination is the simpler case. Compelled speech can serve as a tool 
of indoctrination because requiring a person - especially a schoolchild 
- to repeat a message can eventually cause her to believe it. Because 
compelled subsidization does not require dissenters to repeat any 
message, it is a poor tool for indoctrination. As Justice Harlan noted in 
Lathrop, there can be no "desire to induce belief or conviction by the 
device of forcing a person to identify himself with the expression of such 
views ... where the connection between the payment of an individual's 
dues and the views to which he objects is factually so remote."no 
If there is a coherent argument that compelled subsidization violates 
dissenters' freedom of belief, it is that it interferes with their ability to 
exercise, realize, or act on their beliefs, in the way Wooley emphasized. 
106 [d. at 629. 
107 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.s. 705, 713-14 (1977). 
loa Id. at 713. 
109 Id. at 715. 
110 Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 859 (1961) (Harlan, I., concurring). 
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The argument must be that by requiring someone to pay for a message 
with which she disagrees, compelled subsidization requires her to act 
contrary to her own beliefs in a way that violates the protections of the 
First Amendment. But, as noted above, one might object to virtually 
every form of state compulsion on similar grounds. We still must 
identify some uniquely relevant harm caused by forcing someone to 
speak or to pay for the speech of others - a harm distinct from the 
interference with belief that potentially accompanies all state 
compulsion. 
One can read Wileman's "crisis of conscience" test as an attempt to 
establish such a limiting principle.Ill But only four years later, United 
Foods reversed course and rejected this test as unprincipled. l12 And it is 
true that the crisis-of-conscience line is not so bright as one might hope. 
But the real problem with Wileman's proposed standard is not that it is 
vague, but that it does not indicate what is special about the compelled 
subsidization of speech. Even if we allow that being required to support 
a message one disagrees with can create a crisis of conscience, so might 
being required to pay for a non-expressive activity or, for that matter, to 
engage in or refrain from other non-expressive acts. This is not a 
principle that distinguishes a special threat posed by the compelled 
subsidization of speech. 
One clear constitutional boundary is the line around cases where 
dissenters' religious beliefs are at stake. If the free speech clause does not 
draw the line here, the free exercise clause does. It is telling that the 
plaintiffs both in Barnette and in Wooley were Jehovah's Witnesses and 
objected to the required speech acts on religious grounds. This is also 
the point of Jefferson's statement, often quoted out of context and in 
support of the compelled subsidization doctrine, that "to compel a man 
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which 
he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical."ll3 The sentence comes from 
Jefferson's Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and concerns only the 
compelled subsidization of religious activities, gesturing toward the link 
between the anti-establishment and free exercise principles. When the 
state compels a person to do something contrary to her religiOUS beliefs, 
l\l Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521' U.S. 457,472 (1997). 
112 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001). 
113 Jefferson, supra note 10, at xvii. For compelled subsidization decisions that appeal to 
Jefferson's statement, and a similar one from Madison, both out of context, see Chi. 
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.s. 292, 306 n.15 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 
U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 779 n.4 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 790 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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regardless of whether the requirement is that she speak, pay money for 
speech, or engage in some conduct with no relation to speech, the First 
Amendment is clearly implicated and the state action is subject to 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Yet, this is insufficient to ground either the right against compelled 
speech or the right against the compelled subsidization of the speech of 
others. Each requires an argument both narrower and broader than the 
free exercise principle. The argument must be narrower because these 
rights are supposed to apply only to compulsion to engage in or to fund 
expressive activities, while the free exercise interest extends to any 
compelled action that goes against one's religious beliefs. It must be 
broader because these rights are meant to apply also where dissenters' 
objections are purely secular. 
Here is an answer for compelled speech: The requirement that a 
speaker herself give voice to a message can impinge on her beliefs -
religious or not - in a distinctive way because it is often central to our 
most deeply held beliefs that we be able to express them in words.114 
This is true whether those beliefs are religious, political, moral, or 
otherwise central to our self-identity. Forcing a person to express a 
message contrary to such beliefs can thus threaten her ability to control 
what she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important. 
The principle here is narrower in the necessary way, for it highlights 
what is special about speech or expression, and therefore answers the 
objection that the government requires people to do all sorts of non-
expressive things that they disagree with. It is also broader than the free 
exercise principle in the right way, for it is not limited to religious dissent 
from the required message. This is how the First Amendment right 
114 Abner Greene emphasizes this sort of harm in his account of the First Amendment's 
prohibition on compelled speech: 
My proposal here is that compelled speech cases ... should be seen as autonomy 
or personhood cases . . .. Just as it would be hard to justify a governmental 
requirement that everyone wear blue on Fridays, or that everyone eat ice cream 
once a week, so it is hard to justify a governmental requirement that everyone 
say the pledge of allegiance. The concern in the pledge of allegiance situation, 
thus, is centered not on the speech involved, but rather on the intrusion on and 
insult to the person and the weakness of the regulatory need. 
Greene, supra note 23, at 481; see also Paul G. Stem, Note, A Pluralistic Reading of the First 
Amendment and its Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE 1.J. 925,935-36 (1990) (arguing that 
ability to speak freely is essential to freedom of belief because "[s]peaking with others 
about their rival values and ideals is ... constitutively linked to the possibility of an 
individual agent exercising a deliberative choice of how she wants to live"). 
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against compelled speech can be grounded in the freedom of belief.lls 
But does this argument, or one like it, carryover to the compelled 
subsidization of the speech of others? It does not, and for two reasons. 
First, the compelled act itself - paying a mandatory fee - has too little 
moral content. The point can be made by way of analogy. We recognize 
the conscientious objector's right not to carry a gun, but not her right not 
to pay taxes that fund the military.1l6 One reason for this difference is 
that we do not consider the act of paying taxes to touch on her beliefs in 
the same way that military service would.1I7 Similarly, the mere act of 
paying for an objectionable message interferes less with a dissenter's 
beliefs than would being forced to express that message herself. Like the 
taxpaying conscientious objector, she is not required to engage in the 
very activities she finds objectionable. This distinction is not an a priori 
moral truth - a radical consequentialist might refuse to recognize any 
difference between these cases. But ours is not such a morality. The 
difference between paying for and doing reflects a real difference in our 
attitudes towards these different categories of compulsion. Among other 
things, we find that it interferes more with a person's ability to act in 
accordance with her beliefs when she is required to do something she 
considers intrinsically wrong than when she is required to underwrite 
someone else's acts that she believes wrong. 
The second reason why compelled subsidization does not interfere 
with freedom of belief is the semantic gulf between the act of paying and 
the speech it helps fund. Compelling a person to express a message 
herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief. It 
threatens her ability to control what she tells the world about who she is 
and what she holds important - forms of expression that can trigger the 
First Amendment because they are essential to realizing certain deeply 
held beliefs. The requirement that a person do no more than pay for a 
message she disagrees with does not threaten this sort of harm. I touch 
on a theme here that will be explored at greater length in the next part of 
this Article, which discusses dissenters' expressive interests. But, the 
thesis can be stated now: The mere act of paying a mandatory 
assessment does not identify the payer with the message her payments 
lIS Whether it explainS the Court's compelled speech cases is a question that need not 
be answered here. It is enough to show that it is a coherent way of thinking about 
compelled speech as a special threat to freedom of belief. 
116 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). 
117 See id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that in instance like tax case, 
"almost insurmountable burden" should be placed on objector who claims that 
governmental compulsion conflicts with religious beliefs). 
HeinOnline -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1117 2004-2005
2005] A First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization 1117 
help fund. No one mistakes that act for an expression of belief. There is 
no signifier-signified relationship. Consequently, the mere act of paying 
does not interfere with the dissenter's ability to express her beliefs. 
While she may object to the requirement that she fund the message, any 
harm she suffers is not a distinctively First Amendment harm. liB 
The claim that compelled subsidization of the speech of others 
infringes on dissenters' First Amendment freedom of belief is ultimately 
untenable. Compelled subsidization is not a tool of indoctrination. Nor 
does it interfere with dissenters' ability to practice or realize their beliefs 
in any distinctively First Amendment way. Justice Harlan put the point 
as follows: "Of course it is disagreeable to see a group, to which one has 
been required to contribute, decide to spend its money for purposes the 
contributor opposes. But the Constitution does not protect against the 
mere play of personal emotions. 11119 If the compelled subsidization 
doctrine is grounded in a First Amendment harm to individual 
dissenters, that harm must be of a different sort. 
B. Does Compelled Subsidization Interfere with Dissenters' Freedom of 
Speech? 
The other argument that the Court and individual justices have put 
forward in support of the doctrine is that compelled subsidization 
interferes with dissenters' ability to speak - that it involves the same 
sort of expressive harm that compelled speech does. The argument goes 
back to Black's and Douglasis 1961 opinions in International Ass'n of 
Machinists v. Street and Lathrop v. Donahue,120 though it gained 
11' Wasserman, who advocates a freedom-of-belief type argument, argues that the First 
Amendment harm of compelled subsidization does not turn on a public connection 
between the funder and the message funded because "[t]he dignitary interest in freedom of 
conscience rests on an inward focus on the individual's own mind," not "how the 
reasonable outside world views or understands the message and the individual's 
connection to it." Wasserman, supra note 23, at 206. But without a semantic nexus, 
Wasserman cannot explain what is special about the compelled subsidization of speech, as 
opposed to payments for non-expressive activities. From the point of view of the 
individual payer, funding non-expressive activities can cause just as much dignitary harm 
as funding speech. Wasserman does suggest that courts limit the compelled subsidization 
doctrine to instances where payments fund expression. [d. at 201-02, 207. But he has no 
principled argument for this restriction, appealing instead to the practical need to cabin the 
doctrine so as to protect the government's ability to use tax dollars as it will and to the First 
Amendment interest in increasing the total amount of speech. [d. at 196-200. 
119 Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.s. 820, 857 (1961) (Harlan, L concurring), 
120 See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, L dissenting) 
("Compelling a man by law to pay his money to elect candidates or advocate laws or 
doctrines he is against differs only in degree, if at all, from compelling him by law to speak 
for a candidate, a party, or a cause he is against."); Lathrop, 367 U.s. at 882 (Douglas, J., 
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momentum after Buckley v. Valeo,l21 which held inter alia that limitations 
on campaign contributions "implicate fundamental First Amendment 
interests."l22 In its simplest form, the argument goes like this: Buckley 
established that contributors have an expressive interest in being able to 
give money to election campaigns and held that the government may no 
more restrict payments for the speech of others than it may restrict 
speech itself. It follows that to compel payments for the speech of others 
threatens dissenters' freedom of expression just as much as compelling 
them to speak. In sh~rt, compelled subsidization is a species of 
compelled speech and subject to the same constitutional protections.l23 
Stated so simply, one of the argument's flaws is obvious: Buckley and 
the campaign finance cases that followed have not provided campaign 
contributions the same level of First Amendment protection afforded to 
political speech. Buckley held that, unlike speech, the "quantity of 
commutation by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the 
size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.,,124 The Court concluded 
that contributors did not have the same expressive interest in their 
contributions that speakers have in the words they utter. It therefore 
upheld contribution limits, though analogous restrictions on how much 
a speaker could say would clearly be unconstitutional. If Buckley stands 
for anything, it is that payments for speech, while enjoying some degree 
of First Amendment protection, are not speech. The state may restrict 
payments for the speech of others in ways that it is not permitted to 
dissenting) (emphasizing "the inroads of an integrated bar on the liberty and freedom of 
lawyers to espouse such causes as they choose"). 
121 See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 504 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1,9-10 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977); id. at 255-56 (Powell, J., concurring). Lehnert also drew the 
connection between compelled subsidization and compelled speech, though it did not 
mention Buckley. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.s. 507, 516-17 (1991) (citing Wooley 
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)). 
122 Buckley v. Valejo, 424 U.S. 1,23 (1976) (cited in Abood, 431 U.s. at 234). McConnell 
does not expressly depart from this view, though it does minimize the expressive value of a 
campaign contribution for the contributor, as opposed to the candidate receiving it. See 
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 135 ("Because the communicative value of large contributions inheres 
mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients, we have said that 
contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to 
'preven[tj candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for 
effective advocacy.'" (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21)). 
12.3 Accord Wileman, 521 U.S. at 478-87 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
124 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. But see Nixon v. Shrink, 528 U.S. 377,414 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) ("In Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Camm., 470 
U.S. 480 ... (1985), we cast aside the argument that a contribution does not represent the 
constitutionally protected speech of a contributor .... "). 
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restrict speech itself. 
A close reading of Buckley reveals a second, methodological error in 
the above argument. The Buckley Court reached its conclusion only after 
closely examining the particular expressive potential of campaign 
contributions, that is, their semantic content. Whether payment for the 
speech of others also triggers the protections of the compelled speech 
doctrine can be decided only by further engaging in this essentially 
interpretive task, only through a close examination of the particular 
expressive interests at stake.125 There is no simple syllogism from the fact 
that an activity has some expressive content, and therefore warrants 
some First Amendment protection, to the conclusion that it deserves the 
full First Amendment panoply. 
Let us therefore return to the basics of compelled speech and how it 
interferes with dissenters' expressive interests (as opposed to their 
freedom of belief). While the Supreme Court's early decisions 
emphasized the ways in which compelled speech can burden freedom of 
belief, later decisions have emphasized dissenters' ability to speak. Once 
we have a clear picture of how compelled speech interferes with 
dissenters' expressive interests, we can then ask whether compelled 
subsidization causes a similar harm. 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wooley v. Maynard, and its holding that 
New Hampshire's license plate requirement was constitutionally 
impermissible, sharpens the compelled speech question. Rehnquist's 
argument was that a compulsory license plate motto simply was not 
speech. 
What the Court does not demonstrate is that there is any "speech" 
or "speaking" in the context of this case. . .. The issue, 
unconfronted by the Court, is whether appellees, in displaying, as 
they are required to do, state license tags, the format of which is 
known to all as having been prescribed by the State, would be 
considered to be advocating political or ideological views. 126 
125 This more particularized approach can be contrasted with that taken by jacobs's 
analysis of the link between the compelled subsidization and campaign contribution limits. 
Jacobs argues that the First Amendment harm is the same in both contexts - "the 
marketplace of ideas effect rather than . . . any abstract assessment of the degree of 
individual autonomy impingement" that brings the First Amendment into play. Jacobs, 
supra note 9, at 455. But restrictions on campaign contributions may well entail individual 
harms (the ability of the contributor to express her support for a candidate in her chosen 
medium) that compelled subsidization of speech does not. 
126 Wooley, 430 U.s. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Abner Greene advocates a 
similar analysis of whether compelled speech counts as speech at alL Greene, supra note 23, 
at 473-75. Rehnquist, however, has probably since abandoned this position. See Boy Scouts 
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There are two ideas at work here. First, Rehnquist is saying that what 
matters is whether the dissenter is likely to be identified or associated 
with the message she is required to carry. Second, he insinuates that so 
long as it is common knowledge that she is compelled to carry the 
message, no one will interpret her words as an expression of her opinion. 
Thus Rehnquist concludes that "[t]he State has not forced appellees to 
'say' any thing. ,,127 If compelled "speech" is not really speech for First 
Amendment purposes, then how can it possibly burden the expressive 
interests protected by the First Amendment? 
The Wooley majority did not answer Rehnquist's objection. As 
discussed above, the majority opinion emphasized the interference with 
the dissenter's freedom of belief, as opposed to her ability to speak. 
Consequently, the Court rejected the underlying premise of Rehnquist's 
128 
argument. But subsequent compelled speech cases have addressed 
Rehnquist's challenge and have held that, in most cases, the sina qua non 
of a First Amendment compelled speech problem is a strong likelihood 
that the compelled message will be associated with the person required to 
carry it. 
Just three years after Wooley, a majority of the Court agreed with the 
first premise of Rehnquist's analysis. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
concerned a shopping center owner's objection to California's 
requirement that petitioners be allowed to use the public spaces in the 
shopping center to gather signatures.129 Rehnquist's majority opinion 
found no First Amendment violation and explained that result as 
follows: 
Most important, the shopping center by choice of its owner is ... a 
business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as 
they please. The views expressed by members of the public in 
passing out pamphlets or seeing signatures for a petition thus will 
not likely be identified with those of the owner. l30 
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.s. 640, 653 (2000) ("Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the 
very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the 
world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."). 
127 Wooley, 430 U.s. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
128 ld. at 7l6-17. 
129 Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 74 (1980). 
130 ld. at 87 (emphasis added); see also id. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[S]peech 
interests are affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed by members 
of the public on commercial property as the views of the owner."); Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. 
Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,12 (1986) ("PruneYard ... does not undercut the proposition that 
forced associations that burden protected speech are impermiSSible."). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist also found it Significant that no specific message was dictated and that the 
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PruneYard, however, drops the second idea in Rehnquist's Wooley dissent 
- the idea that a compelled message will never be identified with its 
carrier. It is replaced by an empirical inquiry into context and meaning. 
This inquiry asks whether this is the sort of situation in which observers 
are likely to identify the message with the person forced to carry it. The 
case of the shopping center does not meet this test, but other cases might. 
Thus in a concurring opinion, Justice Powell explained that in a different 
case, compelled identification with a message might interfere with a 
dissenter's expressive interests, because it would put him in a bind: 
either say nothing, in which case he "has been compelled to affirm 
someone else's belief," or disavow the compelled message, in which case 
he "has been compelled to speak when [he] would prefer to remain 
'1 t ,,131 S1 en. 
In its two major compelled-speech cases since Prune Yard, the Supreme 
Court has maintained this approach.132 In Pacific Gas and Electric v. Public 
Utilities Commission of California, the Court held that a requirement that a 
public utility place the newsletter of a third party in its billing envelope 
violated the First Amendment.133 Powell's plurality opinion follows the 
logic of PruneYard, but concludes that in the case of a billing envelope, 
unlike a shopping mall, there is a "forced association with potentially 
hostile views" that violates the First Amendment right to remain silent. l34 
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, a 
owner could expressly disavow any connection with the message. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 
87. 
131 PruneYard, 447 U.s. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring). 
132 See also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.s. 622, 655-56 (1994) (Cable must-carry 
provisions do not force messages on cable operators, because there is "little risk that cable 
viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas 
or messages endorsed by the cable operator."). 
133 Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 20-21 (1986). 
134 rd. at 18; see also id. at 15 (requirement "impermissibly requires [the utility] to 
associate with speech with which [it] may disagree); id. at 20-21 ("the Commission's order 
impermissibly burdens appellant's First Amendment rights because it forced appellant to 
associate with the views of other speakers .... "). 
Justice Burger concurred, agreeing with the relevance of the possible identification 
of the utility with the message it was required to carry. rd. at 21 (Burger, L concurring) 
(identifying "the central question presented by this case" as "the infringement of Pacific's 
right to be free from forced association with views with which it disagrees"). 
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from Pacific Gas, based in part on his different 
opinion as to the factual matter of whether consumers were likely to identify the utility 
with the opinions expressed in the insert. "The plurality argues ... that the right of access 
also implicates [the utility's] right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others .... 
The plausibility of any such prediction depends on the perceived ineffectiveness of a 
disclaimer or the absence of any effective alternative means for consumer groups ... to 
communicate to the ratepayers." rd. at 31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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unanimous Court held that Massachusetts violated the First Amendment 
rights of private parade organizers by requiring them to allow a group 
promoting homosexual rights to march in their St. Patrick's Day 
parade.l35 The Court again posed the question in terms of whether the 
speaker was likely to be identified with the message it was required to 
carry.l36 It concluded that in "the context of an expressive parade ... 
each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of a whole, II 137 
and that spectators were therefore likely to identify the group's message 
with the parade as a whole. l38 
We can now return to the compelled subsidization of the speech of 
others. Taking Buckley's particularized analysis as a model, the question 
is whether, or to what extent, the expressive interests at stake in 
compelled speech - the likely identification of the speaker with the 
message she is forced to carry - are also in play in the compelled 
subsidization of the speech of others. 
To begin with, let us distinguish the situation where an individual 
dissenter objects because the speech she is paying for expressly identifies 
her with its message. Thus a milk producer might object to a generic 
milk advertisement with the tagline, "Brought to you by America's dairy 
farmers," or an auto worker to a union ad that concludes, "A message 
from America's auto workers." If this is the complaint, then it has 
nothing to do with compelled subsidization. The expressive harm - the 
forced association with an objectionable message - lies in the false 
attribution and exists whether or not the dissenter is required to pay for 
that message. In fact, this is simply another species of compelled speech 
- different in that the dissenter is not required to carry the message 
herself, but identical with respect to the nature of the harm. The 
problem is nicely captured by an appropriate metaphor: the government 
is putting words in people's mouths. 
Putting aside such generic identification with a message, the question 
is whether compelled payments themselves cause an expressive harm. 
They do not, because there is no semantic nexus between the act of 
paying and the message expressed. Buckley was right to recognize that 
voluntary payments for the speech of others are often interpreted as 
135 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
559 (1995). 
136 [d. at 575. 
"7 ld. at 577. 
"3 ld. at 575 ("GLIB's participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from 
the Council's customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its 
message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well."). 
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symbolic acts of support, that they have an (albeit limited) expressive 
content. But - and this is a version of the second idea implicit in 
Rehnquist's Wooley dissent - our linguistic community does not 
interpret the payment of mandatory assessments in the same way. And, 
because the act of paying is not intrinsically symbolic, there is no chance 
that compelled subsidization will be mistaken for something it is not, as 
a newsletter in a billing envelope or a banner in a parade might be. The 
one simply does not signify the other. The Wileman majority made 
precisely this point when it rejected the idea of a connection between 
compelled subsidization and compelled speech. 
The use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require 
respondents to repeat an objectionable message out of their own 
mouths, require them to use their own property to convey an 
antagonistic ideological message, force them to respond to a hostile 
message when they "would prefer to remain silent," or require them 
to be publicly identified or associated with another's message. 
Respondents are not required themselves to sgeak, but are merely 
required to make contributions for advertising. 9 
There is no danger that dissenting payers will be understood to be 
espousing the message their payments help fund. Consequently, 
according to the compelled speech doctrine itself, dissenters have no 
First Amendment complaint. l40 Though their payments fund expression, 
the requirement to pay does not cause them an expressive harm.141 
139 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997) (emphasis added, 
citations omitted); see also Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239-40 (2000) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) ("In each [of the Court's compelled speech] cases, the government was 
imposing far more directly and offenSively on an objecting individual than collecting the 
fee that indirectly funds the jumble of other speakers' messages in this case." (citing Hurley, 
515 U.s. at 572-74, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977), and W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.s. 624,626-29 (1943»; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.s. 507, 541 
(1991) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Petitioners' expressive 
capacities have not been conscripted. Rather, petitioners have simply been required to pay 
a pro rata share of lobbying costs incurred by a union representative, chosen pursuant to 
majority vote."); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 806 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) ("No one's desire or power to speak his mind is checked or curbed."); Lathrop 
v. Donahue, 367 U.s. 820, 860 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("1 do not think a ... decision 
by the representatives of the majority of the bar members to devote some part of the 
organization's funds to the furtherance of a legislative proposal so identifies the individual 
payor of dues with the belief expressed that we are in the Barnette realm of 'asserted power 
to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief or to engage in any 
ceremony of assent to one."'). 
140 Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87, 99 (1980). 
141 Given that this conclusion rests on an analysis of compelled speech that Justice 
Rehnquist introduced in Wooley and has never disclaimed (though see supra note 126), it is 
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This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's broader 
formulation of the difference between speech and conduct. In Texas v. 
Johnson, the Court held that "[i]n deciding whether particular conduct 
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First 
Amendment into play, we have asked whether '[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.",l42 
Rehnquist suggested in his Wooley dissent that compelled speech is 
unusual because it does not meet the first prong of this test - the 
speaker does not necessarily want to convey the message and thus the 
message is not intended in the relevant sense.143 Subsequent cases have 
recognized, however, that some compelled speech still meets the second 
prong - it can be interpreted as conveying a message - and therefore 
still triggers First Amendment scrutiny.l44 Compelled subsidization of the 
speech of others can satisfy neither prong. It is neither intended as a 
communicative act nor understood as one. As such, it does not qualify 
as speech under the Texas v. Johnson test. The First Amendment protects 
the rights of individual dissenters - be it to freedom of belief or to 
freedom of speech - only to the extent that dissenters intend to say 
something or will be viewed as doing so. Where neither is the case, there 
is no First Amendment harm. 
difficult to understand why Rehnquist has consistently signed on to opinions identifying 
the right against compelled subsidization with the right against compelled speech 
(including Souter's dissent from Wileman). Rehnquist himself, in his dissent from Wooley, 
anticipated the issues discussed here and perfectly described the lack of an expressive 
interest at stake in compelled subsidization: 
For example, were New Hampshire to erect a multitude of billboards, each 
proclaiming "Live Free or Die," and tax all citizens for the cost of erection and 
maintenance, clearly the message would be "fostered" by the individual citizen-
taxpayer and just as clearly those individuals would be "instruments" in that 
communication. Certainly, however, that case would not fall within the ambit of 
Barnette. In that case, as in this, there is no affirmation of belief. For First 
Amendment principles to be implicated, the State must place the citizen in the 
position of either apparently, or actually "asserting as true" the message. 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.s. 705,721 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
142 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405,410-11 (1974)). 
143 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
144 Hurley, 515 U.s. at 575, 577; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 
15, 18,20-21. 
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C. A First Amendment Harm to Individual Dissenters? 
We have yet to be provided with an adequate description of a First 
Amendment harm to individuals who are forced to subsidize the speech 
of others. Recourse to freedom of belief fails, first, because the mere act 
of paying for the actions of others is too morally thin to support the 
claim that it significantly interferes with dissenters' ability to act on their 
beliefs and, second, because there is no principled explanation of why 
the compelled subsidization of speech interferes with dissenters' beliefs 
more than payments for other activities. The appeal to freedom of 
expression fails because no one is likely to identify dissenters with the 
views their payments help fund. As a matter of logic, this does not 
prove that compelled subsidization causes individual dissenters no First 
Amendment harm. It does, however, show that we have yet to receive a 
convincing account of such a harm. The burden is on those who say it 
exists to come forward with an explanation of where it lies. l45 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT NOT TO 
SUBSIDIZE 
Without a coherent account of precisely how compelled subsidization 
threatens First Amendment interests, the outcomes of cases have 
depended on the competing intuitions of the justices deciding them, 
14' Lawrence Tribe has argued that both the compelled speech and the compelled 
subsidization cases should be understood as resting on 
a right not to be used or commandeered to do the state's ideological bidding by 
having to mouth, convey, embody or sponsor a message, especially the state's 
message, with one's voice or body or resources, on one's personal possessions, 
through the composition of the associations one joins or forms, or in their 
selection of teachers, exemplars, and leaders. 
Tribe, supra note 94, at 645. But when he attempts to explain the basis of this First 
Amendment anti-commandeering principle, Tribe returns to the idea that it is the message 
itself, not the fact that it is funded through compelled subsidization, that is the problem: 
In contrast, any legitimate goals the state seeks to achieve by using individuals or 
associations to conveyor endorse its views are likely to be achievable by the state 
speaking with its own voice, at the expense of all taxpayers rather than just those 
few who are singled out to bear the burden as serving as the state's megaphone. 
Id. (emphasis added). The suggestion seems to be that the fact that all taxpayers are not 
asked to pay for the message is evidence that the message itself is problematic - perhaps 
because it is too unpopular or controversial. (Tribe doesn't explain what he means by 
"legitimate.") But this evidentiary observation should not be mistaken for a constitutional 
principle. Tribe's argument suggests that the real problem is not that the cost is born by the 
few, but that the message expressed is not a permissible one. If this is the case, why not 
simply focus on the constitutional legitimacy of the message? 
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rather than on a general rule. Thus we find one test for unions and state 
bars (the three-part Lehnert test), another for commercial advertising 
(most recently germaneness to a non-expressive program), and still a 
third for student fees (legitimate purpose and viewpoint neutrality). 
These various standards are to some extent at odds with one another, 
and none of them provides a clear path forward for deciding future cases 
in other contexts. 
But the situation is not unsalvageable. To say that the outcomes of the 
Supreme Court's compelled subsidization cases have been driven more 
by individual justices' legal and political intuitions about the facts before 
them than by a principled account of the First Amendment interests at 
stake is not to say that those cases were decided wrongly. It is the genius 
of the common law that judges can get it right before they know why. In 
this part, I attempt to abduce a different and more principled account of 
the First Amendment right against compelled subsidization. My thesis is 
that most, though not all, of the outcomes would be kept intact and 
provided a secure foundation were the Supreme Court to hold that the 
distinctive First Amendment interest at stake is not that of individual 
dissenters, but the potential harm to public political discourse. 
A. Old Holdings in New Theory 
It is hardly revolutionary to claim that the First Amendment's free 
speech clause is meant to protect not only individual speakers, but also 
the "marketplace of ideas." The thesis has a long pedigree and continues 
to play a role in discussions of the First Amendment, including the 
debates over the regulation of hate speech, pornography, broadcasting, 
and, as will be discussed in Part IV, campaign finance regulation. l46 I 
will label such approaches "forum theories," because they consider one 
of the essential purposes of the Free Speech Clause to be the protection of 
expressive forums. Forum theories stand opposed to what I will call 
"liberty theories," which treat the protection of the individual's freedom 
of expression as the essential purpose of the First Amendment. 
Forum theories are most often emphasized where individual liberties 
are perceived to threaten the free exchange of ideas or democratic 
processes. Campaign finance regulation is a paradigm case: the freedom 
, .. See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE 
SPEECH (1996); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUI10NAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 1405 (1986). For criticism of the idea, see Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual 
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993). 
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of wealthy individuals to wade into electoral discourse, it is claimed, 
distorts the electoral process. To protect the forum, we must restrict the 
liberty of individual contributors.147 
This fact - that one most often sees an appeal to a forum principle 
where it is in opposition to the liberty principle - can give rise to the 
illusion that the principles stand in a necessary tension with one another. 
They do not, and not only because, as the forum theorist will tell you, 
individual freedom of expression is essential to a properly functioning 
marketplace of ideas. The principles are not coextensive in their 
consequences and there can be no tension where those consequences do 
not overlap.l48 Part II showed that the doctrine of compelled 
subsidization cannot be explained by the liberty theory's emphasis on 
harm to individual dissenters. The suggestion now is that a forum 
theory can fill that gap. 
One finds scattered references to this idea in the Supreme Court's 
compelled subsidization opinions. As early as 1961, Justice Black argued 
that the political expenditure of mandatory union dues "injects federal 
compulsion into the political and ideological processes, a result which I 
have supposed everyone would agree the First Amendment was 
particularly intended to prevent.,,149 In his dissent from the Court's most 
recent compelled subsidization decision, Justice Breyer addresses the 
thought (though Kennedy's majority opinion did not mention it) with 
the observation that the compelled subsidization of commercial speech 
does not threaten any "special democratic need to protect the channels of 
public debate, i.e., the communicative process. "ISO Nor has the idea been 
lost on commentators. In a 1983 critical analysis of Abood, Norman 
Cantor argued that "[tJhe critical constitutional interest at stake [in 
147 Not that this is the only reason to regulate campaign financing. 
148 For a similar idea, see Stem, supra note 114. 
149 Int'I Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 789 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); see 
also id. at 788 ("Probably no one would suggest that Congress could, without violating [the 
First] Amendment, pass a law taxing workers, or any persons for that matter (even 
lawyers), to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups favored 
by the Government to elect their candidates or promote their controversial causes."). 
Justice Harlan responded to this point in his concurrence to Lathrop, a case decided 
the same day, with the argument that there was a "clear distinction in the wording of the 
First Amendment between the protections of speech and religion, only the latter providing 
a protection against 'establishment,'" and that even if political establishment were a 
problem, government support of unions or bar associations "does not provide a fixed, 
predictable conduit for government encouragement of particular views." Lathrop v. 
Donohue, 367 U.s. 820, 852-53 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
ISO United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. 405, 426 (2001) (citing Robert Post, The 
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA 1. REv. 1, 14-15 (2000». 
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compelled subsidization] is governmental establishment of particular 
political causes."ISI But these have remained voices in the wilderness, as 
most justices and many commentators still hold fast to the idea that the 
harm is to individual dissenters. ls2 It is thus worth working through the 
details of the alternative approach. 
Most, if not all, of the law of compelled subsidization follows from the 
least controversial sort of forum principle, which I will call the "political 
forum theory." From Meiklejohn on, proponents have focused the role 
of the First Amendment in the protection and fostering of political 
forums, as distinguished from scientific, artistic, commercial, or other 
speech platforms. The institutions in which political discourse takes 
place, it is argued, deserve special protection because "[a] free 
marketplace of ideas is essential to the proper functioning of a 
democratic system."IS3 The First Amendment, on this reading, "protects 
the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which 
154 
we govern." 
From the general principle that a central function of the First 
Amendment is the protection of political forums we can extract any 
number of corollaries, some more controversial than others. The 
relevant one for our purposes is what Robert Kamenshine has called the 
First Amendment's "implied political establishment clause."ISS This is 
the principle that the state has no business participating in public debate 
on contentious political issues (which is not to say that the state may not 
legitimately speak in other forums or on other topics).I56 The idea is 
exemplified by the recent outcry over the Department of Health and 
Human Services ("HHS") production of videos that were distributed to 
151 Cantor, supra note 23, at 7; see also Jacobs, supra note 23, at 171-76. 
152 See especially Wasserman, supra note 23, at 191 ("The prohibition on 
government-compelled expression or support of private expression protects these interests 
in personhood and individual liberty by prohibiting government interference with 
individual thought, conscience, or belief through a requirement that one adopt, present, or 
support any message or idea that she does not wish to adopt, present, or support." 
(emphasis added»; see also Greene, supra note 23, at 466-67. 
153 Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 
67 CAL. L. REv. 1104, 1105 (1979). Kamenshine expressly limits his "political establishment" 
principle (see infra) to political speech. Id. at 1113 ("The principal interest that the first 
amendment protects is freedom of political expression necessary to the proper functioning 
of a democratic system. In view of this, courts should deny a first amendment challenge to 
nonpolitical speech by the government."); cf Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 
lSI, 186-87 (1996). 
154 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 255. 
155 Kamenshine, supra note 153 passim. 
156 Participation in a marketplace is different from the regulation of a marketplace. On 
the version advocated here, the political establishment principle applies only to the former. 
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local television news departments for rebroadcast without identifying 
HHS as their source and which portrayed a new Medicare drug law as a 
boon to the elderly.157 While the agency had an obligation to inform the 
public of the new rules, its job was not to promote the changes or the 
elected officials responsible for them. The intuitive idea that such 
"political establishment" is contrary to First Amendment principles can 
be filled out with two separate arguments. 
First, public political discourse functions correctly when the mix of 
voices reflects the varying potencies of different viewpoints within the 
populace as a whole. The space that a given viewpoint occupies in the 
political marketplace of ideas should be a function of its adherents' 
numbers and the strength of their convictions. Government restrictions 
on speech cause distortions because they act like restrictive zoning 
ordinances, preventing certain views or interests from garnering the real 
estate they deserve. But as any developer will tell you, the shape of a 
city is driven just as much by government subsidies - tax breaks, bond 
issues, etc. The government also distorts public political discourse when 
it subsidizes (or forces others to subsidize) one viewpoint or interest at 
the expense of others. Because the First Amendment provides special 
protections to political forums, it prohibits such state interference with 
them. 
The second argument involves a version of the "who will watch the 
watchmen" problem and applies particularly to debate on the policy and 
political issues on which elections turn - the issues that make up the 
platforms of candidates and political parties. Elected officials are 
interested parties in public discussion of these matters. Consequently, 
there is a danger that when these officials (or those beholden to them) 
put the government's muscle behind one side or another, it is not simply 
to express their views, but to use their power to perpetuate their 
positions in government. Because it does not employ the normative 
ideal of a proper mix of voices, this argument is less ambitious than the 
first. Instead, it emphasizes a special danger of government 
participation in political discourse. The ~roblem here is not distortion, 
but conflict of interest and manipulation. 8 As Kamenshine puts it, "[I]f 
157 See Robert Pear, Ruling Says White House's Medicare Videos Were Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2004, at A24; Robert Pear, U.S. Videos, for TV News, Come Under Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al. 
158 The attentive reader will have noticed that this second argument involves a sort of 
anti-indoctrination principle. But unlike the risk of indoctrination through compelled 
speech (recall the discussion of Barnette above), the target indoctrinee is the public at large, 
not the individual subjects of a state compulsion. 
HeinOnline -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1130 2004-2005
1130 University of California, Davis [Vol. 38:1087 
a government can manipulate [the] marketplace, it can ultimately 
subvert the processes by which the people hold it accountable.,,159 
The most obvious tool for political establishment is government 
speech - where the state uses tax dollars to speak or to pay for the 
speech of others. l60 But the compelled subsidization of private speech 
can likewise be a mechanism for political establishment.161 When the 
government requires some individuals to pay for the political or 
ideological speech of others, and when the recipients of the funds have 
an identifiable and controversial political agenda, then the government is 
essentially putting its muscle behind one interest or point of view at the 
expense of others and is engaging in a form of political establishment. 
This suggests the following standard for compelled subsidization cases: 
The compelled subsidization of the speech of others violates the First 
Amendment only when the funds collected are used to promote the message of 
an identifiable viewpoint or interest in debate on a controversial political 
issue. 162 This relatively simple formulation gives rise to a number of 
159 Kamenshine, supra note 153, at 1105 (footnote omitted); accord MARK G. YUOOF, 
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLmcS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 15 
(1983) (arguing that we must guard against government participation in political discourse 
that might be used "to falsify consent" by creating "a majority will through uncontrolled 
indoctrination activities"). 
160 These implications have been explored extensively in YUOOF, supra note 159. 
161 In fact, Kamenshine reads Abood as a political establishment case. Kamenshine, 
supra note 153, at 1107-09. While Kamenshine is right that Abood's outcome can be justified 
on political establishment principles, the Court's reasoning was based on very different 
principles. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.s. 209, 234-36 (1977). 
The idea of a political establishment principle is one way to unpack Tribe's reference 
to "legitimate goals" the state may seek to achieve when it speaks, which may be 
threatened by compelled subsidization. See supra note 145. 
162 Cantor also argues that the crucial harm that the compelled subsidization doctrine 
protects against is government meddling in the political marketplace. But he focuses on 
the compelled subsidization of speech by unions and other service organizations, and ends 
up with a test that is more specific and makes more factual assumptions than the above 
proposal. Cantor concludes that there are sufficient safeguards against political 
establishment if "the institution benefiting from forced payments in fact performs a useful 
service, ... the payors are among the class benefiting, or potentially benefiting from such 
services [and] any 'political' outlays by the institution are related to the basic object of the 
institution ... and these political outlays are not being exploited strictly for partisan ends." 
Cantor, supra note 23, at 38. 
Jacobs argues that the constitutional touchstone for both compelled subsidization 
and compelled speech, which she would group together under the title "compelled 
expression," should be whether "the government's purpose is to manipulate the speech 
market to adjust the relative weights of the voices in it." Jacobs, supra note 23, at 171; see 
also Jacobs, supra note 9, at 459-69. With respect to compelled subsidization, this is broadly 
consistent with the. above proposal. But there are significant differences in the details. For 
one thing, Jacobs attempts to resuscitate the Lathrop factors as the appropriate test under 
this rationale. Jacobs, supra note 23, at 173-75. Jacobs's rule would also seem to hold that 
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complexities in its application, which are the topic of the next part. 
Before turning to them, however, I want to argue that the standard 
provides a coherent account of the outcomes of the Court's compelled 
subsidization decisions to date. 
This proposed test has two separate prongs. The first asks whether the 
compelled payments fund political speech. If not, then there is no 
violation of the political establishment principle. If they do fund political 
speech, the court must ask, second, whether they are used to fund an 
identifiable viewpoint or interest. Only if compelled payments do not 
fund political speech or an identifiable viewpoint or interest does the 
program pass First Amendment scrutiny. 
The first prong provides a straightforward per se rule: so long as 
funded speech is neither political nor ideological, there is no First 
Amendment violation. This result is not surprising, given that, for the 
moment, we are considering the implications of a political forum theory. 
But it is also consistent with most of the Supreme Court's holdings in its 
compelled subsidization cases. The Court has occasionally held that 
nonpolitical expenditures do give rise to First Amendment violation. 
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, which applied a limiting 
interpretation of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") that maps onto the First 
Amendment right against compelled subsidization,163 held that a union's 
the government's entrance into any sort of expressive forum, political or not, is 
impermissible. Thus she treats government manipulation of commercial speech as just as 
suspect as manipulation of political speech. Id. at 176-80. Finally, Jacobs lumps compelled 
speech together with compelled subsidization and assumes that both should be governed 
by a single rule. She takes, for instance, the fact that there is no "message alteration" in 
compelled subsidization to be an argument that this cannot be among the First 
Amendment harms of compelled speech. Id. at 166. As the analysis in Part II has 
demonstrated, compelled speech does harm individuals' First Amendment interests in a 
way that compelled subsidization does not. There is no reason to look for a single rule to 
govern both sorts of cases. 
Wasserman also suggests that public forums, which embody a sort of viewpoint-
neutrality principle, be immune from the right against compelled subsidization. 
Wasserman, supra note 23, at 231-36. But his argument for this approach relies on an 
account of the right against compelled subsidization that emphasizes the harm to 
individual dissenters and a notion that the forum mitigates this harm. "No speech is, in 
fact, funded with any fees charged and collected by the government in maintaining a 
public forum. Only the forum is funded; that is, only the physical place and the services 
associated with that place or only the pool of money." Id. at 231; see also id. at 168 ("A 
forum, in and of itself, is not expressive. Whatever private speech ultimately occurs in and 
through that forum is irrelevant to the payer's claim."). This quasi-metaphysical argument 
is unsatisfactory. As far as the individual dissenter is concerned (and Wasserman bases his 
argument on the potential harm to the individual), it makes no difference that her money is 
filtered through an intermediary organization or institution. The dignitary harm comes 
from that fact that she is foreseeably forced to fund speech with which she disagrees. 
163 Ellis v. Bd. of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.s. 435,445-48 (1984). In examining the union dues at 
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general orgaruzmg efforts were not sufficiently germane to collective 
bargaining to be allowable under the RLA l64 And, of course, United 
Foods held that compelled payments for industry advertising violated the 
First Amendment if the advertising was not embedded in a larger 
regulatory program.l65 But these are the only two outliers. In both Ellis 
and Lehnert, the Court held that most of the challenged nonpolitical 
union expenditures did not violate the First Amendment (in Ellis, 
conventions, social activities, and union publications; in Lehnert, 
collective bargaining activities of the parent union, a nonpolitical union 
publication, conventions, and preparations for a potentially illegal 
strike).l66 And Wileman went so far as to suggest that only "political or 
ideological disagreement with the content of the message" could 
produce a "crisis of conscience" and therefore implicate the First 
Arnendment.167 While the proposed test suggests that the United Foods 
majority erred, the Court's other constitutional holdings can be kept 
largely intact. 
As for the second prong, it is a factual question whether a given 
organization or program can be expected to engage in speech that is 
identifiable with a specific political viewpoint or interest. Justice Black 
maintained in his 1961 Street dissent that a union's use of members' 
funds for political and legislative activities "injects federal compulsion 
issue in that case, Ellis first applied a limiting interpretation of the RLA set forth in Street, 
367 U.S. 740 (1961), and then applied the Abood standard to the surviving expenditures. It 
is commonly recognized that Street's interpretation of the RLA is at best strained and 
informed less by the text of the statute than a concern to avoid the constitutional issue. See 
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 784-86 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 
799-803 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Abood, 431 U.s. at 232; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 
500 U.S. 507, 555 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Air Line Pilots 
Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.s. 866, 873 (1998). It is also commonly recognized that the Street 
interpretation of the RLA places that act precisely within the limits that later cases would 
establish for the First Amendment right against compelled subsidization. See Lehnert, 500 
U.S. at 516 ("Although [it is a case] of statutory construction, Street [is] instructive in 
delineating the bounds of the First Amendment in this area as well."); id. at 555 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Street [was a statutory case], but there is good 
reason to treat [it] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule suggested in Hanson and later 
confirmed in Abood."). But see Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761-
62 (1988) (applying Street interpretation of RLA to similar proviSion in National Labor 
Relations Act, despite fact that latter did not involve state action so as to raise First 
Amendment issue). 
'64 466 U.S. at 451-53. Ellis also held that litigation not related to the bargaining unit in 
question was not allowable. [d. at 453. The Court subsequently explained, however, that 
part of the problem was the "political and expressive nature of litigation." Lehnert, 500 U.S. 
at 528. 
'65 United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001). 
'66 500 U.S. at 527-32. 
167 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997). 
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into the political and ideological processes," an argument that assumes 
that unions take identifiable and controversial positions on political 
issues. l68 Harlan replied in Lathrop that "the Integrated Bar does not 
provide a fixed, predictable conduit for governmental encouragement of 
particular views," a position he presumably also would have taken with 
respect to unions.169 The holdings of subsequent cases, read in light of 
the proposed principle, suggest that a majority of the Court eventually 
accepted Black's, and not Harlan's, assessment. Since recognizing the 
First Amendment right against compelled subsidization, the Court has 
consistently held that political expenditures by covered unions or 
integrated bars are unconstitutional. 170 Whether this is empirically 
correct is, of course, debatable. 171 But the outcomes of these cases are 
compatible with the recommended test. 
Finally, the proposed standard correctly predicts the outcome in 
Southworth. While the university program at issue in Southworth 
involved the compelled subsidization of political speech, the Court 
found that the fact that funds were not earmarked for a single viewpoint 
or interest rendered it constitutional.172 Though the state university's 
student activity program fostered political speech, the university was not 
selectively funding such speech in a way that threatened the forum 
principle. Southworth's emphasis on viewpoint neutrality provides a 
map of where the Court should take the compelled subsidization 
doctrine. 
The Court can begin to head in the right direction by reversing the 
Eleventh Circuit's holding in Veneman, overturning United Foods, and 
reaffirming the approach it took just four years earlier in Wileman. As 
Wileman recognized, compelled payments for industry-association 
advertising do no First Amendment harm to individual payers. Nor 
does governmental interference in this commercial forum violate the 
principles that coherently explain the Court's other compelled 
subsidization holdings. The beef advertising program at issue in 
Veneman may rub dissenting producers the wrong way. And such 
programs may well be problematic as a matter of public policy, for they 
168 Street, 367 U.s. at 789 (Black, J., dissenting). 
169 Lathrop, 367 U.s. at 853 (Harlan, J., concurring); Street, 367 U.s. at 797 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.). 
170 See supra text accompanying note 83. 
m For an argument that it is incorrect, see Cantor, supra note 23, at 31-35 (arguing that 
"[tlrade unions and many professional associations are primarily service institutions rather 
than facades for a partisan political perspective"). 
In Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217, 233 (2000). 
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often impose the costs of generic advertising disproportionately relative 
to the benefits conferred on individual industry members. But they do 
not violate the First Amendment.173 
B. Applying and Extending the Approach 
The above argument has something like the form of scientific 
induction. Beginning with the outcomes of the Supreme Court's 
compelled subsidization cases, I have proposed a standard that more 
coherently accounts for those holdings than does the Court's own 
reasoning. A First Amendment political establishment principle 
provides the best argument for most of the current limits on compelled 
subsidization. It provides a generally applicable, fairly bright line rule 
that applies to all compelled subsidization cases, as distinguished from 
the germaneness and the substantial-burden criteria the Court has 
applied in the past. That rule clarifies the relevance of the political or 
ideological content of expenditures. And the rule rejects United Foods' 
unexplained reliance on the existence vel non of non-expressive 
regulations. Finally, the approach rests on a sustainable account of the 
First Amendment interests at stake. 
While the proposed standard is based on what is sometimes called a 
"collectivist" theory of the First Amendment, it does not threaten 
individual-liberty theories, which simply cannot account for the right 
against compelled subsidization.174 Compelled subsidization, unlike 
compelled speech, does no harm to individual dissenters' First 
Amendment interests. The political forum theory shows when and why 
compelled subsidization nevertheless poses a First Amendment problem. 
This is not to say that the approach does not give rise to hard 
questions. One has already appeared: the factual question whether it is 
173 Such a holding would lie within the scope of the question the Court granted 
certiorari on: "Whether the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 and the 
implementing Beef Promotion and Research Order violate the First Amendment insofar as 
they require cattle producers to pay assessments to fund generic advertising with which 
they disagree." Veneman, Pet. for Writ of Cert., 2004 WL 304352, at *1; Veneman v. 
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 124 S. Ct. 2389 (2004) [hereinafter Venemen, Pet. for Cert.]. The 
Court may choose to focus instead, however, on the issue of whether the generic 
advertising at issue in the case qualifies as government speech. See Livestock Marketing 
Ass'n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing whether program at issue in 
Veneman qualifies as government speech); Veneman, Pet. for Cert., at 14-24. Of course, it 
might also hold that United Foods effectively overruled Wileman, which would have the 
advantage of clarifying the law with respect to generic industry advertising, though it 
would hardly leave the doctrine as a whole better off. 
174 See Post, supra note 146, at 1114-23; Morris Lipson, Note, Autonomy and Democracy, 
104 YALE L.}. 2249, 2274 (1995). 
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foreseeable that the recipient of compelled funds will use them to 
advance an identifiable political viewpoint or interest. There are at least 
three others: defining what counts as a "debate on a controversial 
political issue," whether we should expand the doctrine to prohibit the 
compelled subsidization of ideological speech, and the implications of 
even more robust forum theories. 
If we stick with political forum theories, there is the definitional 
question: What counts as "debate on a controversial political issue"? 
Reading the proposed standard back into the cases, the Court's decisions 
provide some guidance. For instance, the union cases establish that pro-
union impact litigation is sufficiently political, while union conventions 
are not. But certainly there are undecided cases out there (e.g., IOLTA-
funded constitutional litigation) and more work to be done. 
One source for thinking about a generic definition is the Federal 
Communication Commission's ("FCC") now defunct fairness doctrine.175 
In order to determine when a broadcaster was required to present 
alternative views of an issue discussed on the air, the FCC devised a two-
part test: first, the issue must be controversial, as measured by "the 
degree of attention paid to [itl by government officials, community 
leaders, and the media"; second, it must be of public importance, for 
which the test is "not the extent of media or government attention, but 
rather a subjective evaluation of the impact that the issue is likely to have 
on the community at large.,,176 Another source for line-drawing is the 
Government Accounting Office's ("GAO") evolving interpretation of 
Congressional prohibitions on spending appropriated funds for 
unauthorized "publicity or propaganda."177 The GAO has interpreted 
such provisions to prohibit "the use of appropriated funds for materials 
that are self-aggrandizing, purely partisan in nature, or covert as to 
source," characteristics that can serve as additional indicators of 
particularly problematic expenditures in the context of compelled 
b 'd' . 178 su S1 1zation. 
175 See Kamenshine, supra note 153, at 1113-15. 
'" The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest 
Standard of the Communications Act- Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 12 (1974). 
177 See, e.g., Labor Federal Security Appropriation Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 134, ch. 373, 
§ 702, 65 Stat. 209, 223 (1951) ("No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be 
used for publicity or propaganda purposes not heretofore authorized by Congress."). 
178 In re Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services - Video News Releases, File No. 8-302710 (Gen. Accounting Office May 19, 2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/302710.pdf; see also Letter from 
Anthony H. Gamboa, General Counsel, General Accounting Office, to Hon. Frank R. 
Lautenbert et aI., 6-8, Mar. 10, 2004) (GAO. File No. 8-302504), available at 
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While the FCC and GAO decisions provide useful models, the 
definitional question is not simply a semantic one. Where one draws the 
line around the political should depend at least in part on why one 
thinks political establishment is problematic. Thus the who-will-watch-
the-watchmen argument - according to which the problem with state 
participation in political discourse is that it can be used to "falsify 
consent"l79 - suggests a relatively narrow definition. If the danger is 
incumbent protectionism, the relevant topics are just those likely to be at 
issue in the next election - the issues on which the candidates and 
parties differ. The distortion argument, on the other hand, which finds 
problematic the effect that state favoritism can have on the mix of voices, 
is compatible with a broader definition. On the broader reading, any 
number of controversial issues might count as "political," even though 
public opinion on them is not likely to affect election outcomes. 
As the definition of the political gets broader, escaping the policy 
questions that drive elections, it shades into what might instead be called 
"ideological" speech, which I take to include both speech on 
uncontroversial policy matters (e.g., the validity of the Constitution) and 
on nonpolicy but highly charged value questions (e.g., abstinence vs. 
contraception). As far back as 1961, Justice Black complained that the 
political expenditure of mandatory union dues "injects federal 
compulsion into the political and ideological processes,,,I80 and the Court 
has since continued to invoke the two categories together. 181 One 
explanation of the Court's regular inclusion of the ideological is its 
occasional mistaken adherence to a freedom-of-belief account, for 
ideological disagreement with the message funded is as likely to cause a 
crisis of conscience as is political disagreement. 182 Having rejected that 
argument, it is worth asking whether there is another one for a right 
against funding ideological speech as well. 
Both of the proposed arguments for a political establishment principle 
focus on the function of political forums in democratic decisionmaking. 
To the extent that an issue is neither a matter of current controversy nor 
http://www.gao.gov / decisions/ appro/302710.pdf. (discussing history of GAO's 
interpretation of publicity and propaganda prohibitions). 
17'J YUDOF, supra note 159, at 15. 
180 Int'I Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 789 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
181 See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.s. 457, 472 (1997); Keller v. 
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1,14 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,235-36 
(1977). 
182 See Wileman, 521 U.s. at 472. 
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directly related to public policy, it does not implicate such a principle.l83 
This is not to say that there are not good reasons for the government to 
keep its hands out of ideological forums. But expanding the compelled 
subsidization doctrine to include the compelled subsidization of 
nonpolitical, yet ideological speech involves more difficult line-drawing 
(what distinguishes legitimate topics of public health and welfare from 
nonlegitimate ideological matters?) and re<iuires an argument beyond 
the narrow political establishment principle. Extending the doctrine in 
this direction might well be desirable, but would take some work. 
Finally, it is worth considering the ways in which forum theories can 
cut the other way. Owen Fiss has championed a more far-reaching First 
Amendment forum principle, arguing that state promotion of socially 
orthodox viewpoints, such as "family values," at the expense of minority 
views may well violate the First Amendment. lss Fiss, therefore, can be 
counted among those who would expand the anti-establishment 
principle beyond the political to include at least ideological speech. But 
Fiss also argues that the First Amendment not only limits government 
expressive activities, but requires the government "to ensure the fullness 
and richness of public debate" by actively promoting minority 
viewpoints. l86 Fiss's egalitarian forum principle might well authorize the 
compelled subsidization of political and ideological speech that 
expresses minority viewpoints. 
This is not the place to examine all of the arguments for and against 
Fiss's theory.187 The point is only that once one shifts the focus away 
from the insult to individual dissenters to the impact of compelled 
subsidization on the general mix of expression, a host of new 
considerations emerge. While case outcomes have so far remained on 
the relatively uncontroversial ground of the "no political establishment" 
183 Kamenshine, though he employs a who-will-watch-the-watchmen argument for his 
political establishment principle, nonetheless advocates a definition that encompasses what 
I would call "ideological" speech. Thus he would keep the public importance prong of the 
old fairness doctrine test and drop the controversy requirement. He concludes that while, 
for example, "[t)he capitalism-socialism debate ... is hardly controversial ... , basic first 
amendment values should require that courts prohibit government expressions of the 
intrinsic superiority of a capitalist society." Kamenshine, supra note 153, at 1114. But it is 
doubtful whether this broad definition of the "political" is supported by Kamenshine's 
narrow argument for the political establishment principle. 
184 For a discussion of the line-drawing difficulties, see Lee C. Bollinger, The Sedition of 
Free Speech, 81 MICH. 1. REv. 867 (1983) (reviewing YUOOF, supra note 159). 
185 FISS, IRONY, supra note 146, at 37. 
186 [d. at 4l. 
187 For some cogent comments on the limits of Fiss's approach that are relevant in the 
context of compelled subsidization, see Post, supra note 153, at 187-92. 
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principle, there may well be room for other claims. 
CONCLUSION: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION AGAIN 
This Article' began by noting the way that recent campaign finance 
cases have raised not only the connection between money and speech, 
but also a version of the forum theory - the idea of a First Amendment 
interest in protecting the electoral process from the distorting effects of 
wealth. I want now to return to that topic and briefly survey what, if 
anything, the reformed account of the right against compelled 
subsidization has to say about campaign finance regulation. 
We can begin with the relationship between money and speech. I have 
argued that when money is spent for speech, it does not, for First 
Amendment purposes, magically become equivalent to speech. This is 
not to say, however, that campaign contributions and other political 
donations do not have an expressive component. Buckley rightly saw 
that the act of contributing to a candidate or cause is often both intended 
and understood as a gesture of support. But the expressive content is 
limited, and it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that money 
equals speech. The First Amendment requires empirical sensitivity to 
the nature of the expression, exactly where it is located, and when it is 
threatened. Buckley recognized that a cap on how much one may 
voluntarily contribute for the speech of another does limited harm to the 
undifferentiated expressive content of such contributions. ISS The 
argument in Part II has shown that compelled payments do not even 
have that expressive content and even the limited protections of Buckley 
I . g9 are no onger appropnate. 
What about the First Amendment interest in protecting political 
processes? While the political forum principle operates both in the 
compelled subsidization doctrine and in the area of campaign finance 
regulation, it does so in different ways. First, in the case of compelled 
188 By "expressive content" I mean the semantic content of the act of contributing itself. 
As Buckley additionally observed, campaign contributions also have an effect on the ability 
of the candidates who receive them to express themselves. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,21-
22 (1976). Buckley's discussion on this aspect of contributions rests on another corollary of 
the political forum theory: that candidates who must communicate with a large, dispersed 
electorate require a megaphone. Id. at 19 {"The electorate's increasing dependence on 
television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these 
expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political 
speech."). 
189 This conclusion differs from Jacobs's claim that "the means of fee compulsion as 
opposed to expenditure restriction do not crucially distinguish the student activity fee and 
campaign finance issues." Jacobs, supra note 9, at 458. 
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subsidization, the individual liberty theory does no work and the forum 
theory steps in to fill the gap. When it comes to campaign finance 
regulation, on the contrary, attempts to protect political discourse often 
conflict with the freedom of campaign contributors and independent 
advocates to spend their money, and even voice their opinions, as they 
wish.190 In this respect, campaign finance regulation requires a more 
robust forum principle, one that supports limitations on individual 
liberties that would otherwise trigger protections of the First 
Amendment. 
Second, compelled subsidization is an area where the forum principle 
limits legislative action - the government may not force people to pay 
for the expression of an identifiable controversial political viewpoint or 
interest. In the case of campaign finance regulation, the forum principle 
does not limit what the state may do, but permits the legislature to enact 
laws that might otherwise contravene the First Amendment. Perhaps the 
strongest objection to the above account of the right against compelled 
subsidization is that courts are not equipped to police violations of the 
political establishment principle. In the case of campaign finance 
regulation, on the other hand, it is not the courts but the legislature that 
invokes the principle. There is therefore a place for judicial deference to 
legislative expertise in the campaign finance context. 
There is no simple bridge from the way that the compelled 
subsidization doctrine acts to protect political discourse to a First 
Amendment forum principle that will support campaign finance 
regulation. But the compelled subsidization doctrine indicates one locale 
where the forum principle may already be at work in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. More judicial attention to how it operates in that area 
may at the very least make its application in the other less unnerving. 
Hopefully the Supreme Court will use Veneman to put courts on the road 
there. 
190 Not all campaign finance regulation exhibits this to the same degree. See, e.g., BRUCE 
ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WTIH DoLLARS (2002). 
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